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ABSTRACT 
 
Genocide is often referred to as “the crime of crimes.”  It is a 
crime that is very high on the nastiness scale.  The purpose of the 
genocidaire is of course to destroy a community—a community that 
he regards as a threat to his own community, whether the threat is 
perceived as physical, economic or cultural.  The way this takes 
place and the complicity of law in this process has been extensively 
explored by scholars.  But the process of destroying a community is 
perversely often simultaneously an “exercise in community build-
ing,” a process through which intra-communal bonds and belong-
ing are sought to be strengthened.  This aspect of genocide has been 
entirely neglected by scholars, especially the role of law in that pro-
cess.  This article makes and defends two claims about communities 
and belonging in relation to genocide.  First, it argues that as per-
verse as it sounds, genocide is in fact an exercise in community 
building and law is highly implicated in that process.  It defends the 
thesis with arguments that are conceptual as well as empirical.  The 
second, and more hopeful, claim is that the international response 
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to prevent genocide or to punish genocidaires is itself a process in 
community building, a way of imagining a version of the interna-
tional community, and a counter to the genocidaire’s vision of a 
pure and superior community.  Using two international legal doc-
trines—universal jurisdiction and the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P)—the article shows that international responses to genocide 
are not simply instrumental (preventing and punishing genocide), 
but that they have constitutive dimensions as well.  The interna-
tional community that is imagined through these two doctrines is 
one that is diverse and vulnerable. Put simply, this article is about 
how communities are imagined both in their destructive and consti-
tutive sense. 
 
Keywords: belonging, community, genocide, human rights, in-
ternational crimes, jurisprudence, responsibility to protect, univer-
sal jurisdiction 
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1.  INTRODUCTION:  THE ISSUE–GENOCIDE AND BELONGING 
 
One of the most important questions in the globalized world in 
which we live is the issue of belonging.  Of course, belonging has 
always been an important issue, for to belong is a fundamental hu-
man quest.1  One’s identity, an indispensable feature of one’s life, is 
tied to what, to whom and how one belongs.2 
Although the quest for belonging has always been with us, the 
issue has recently emerged with more intensity and urgency.  There 
are at least two reasons why the issue has currently become a press-
ing issue.  First, globalization has increasingly destabilized tradi-
tional (generally accepted) forms of belonging and units to which 
one belongs.  The manner in which boundaries are drawn and the 
very issue of what constitutes a boundary and a community are con-
stantly changing.3  This has led many to worry as to where and how 
they belong.  Indeed, globalization has led to two seemingly contra-
dictory tendencies.  On the one hand, there is a visible move to form-
ing greater or larger unions among political units, either on a com-
prehensive or limited basis.  Although currently under considerable 
                                                      
 
1 Roger Cohen, The Quest to Belong, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, at A39, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/opinion/cohen-the-quest-to-belong.html 
[https://perma.cc/XMG4-SQ7H] 
 (“If you dig into people who are depressed, you often find that their distress at 
some level is linked to a sense of not fitting in, an anxiety about where they belong: 
displacement anguish.”).  
2 See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS 
OF POLITICAL PARADOX 158 (1991) (“Identity, in some modality or other, is an indis-
pensable feature of human life”). 
3 Adeno Addis, Community and Jurisdictional Authority, in BEYOND 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 32 (Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen eds. 2012) 
(“Indeed, in the era of globalization, the process of continuous change may be one 
of the most salient and most permanent features of communities.”).  See Adeno Ad-
dis, Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the 
Diaspora, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 963, 1039–40 (2012) (arguing that boundaries 
that form communities are not necessarily territorial and they often overlap). Idriss 
Fofana, A Crisis of Belonging, HARV. INT’L REV. 34, 34 (2009) (“Relations between 
Rwanda and the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] have been long affected by 
a crisis of belonging among ethnic Rwandans in the eastern DRC.  Since the early 
colonial times, the Kivu Provinces have served as the refuge of choice for the losers 
of Rwanda’s brutal power policies.  Every new large migration into DRC has raised 
the question of who among the country’s many ethnic Rwandans should count as 
Congolese.”). 
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stress, the European Union is one obvious example of a comprehen-
sive union.  By “comprehensive union” I refer to a union across 
many areas—economic, political, monetary, defense, etc.  But there 
are other unions that are limited to specific areas of life.  One exam-
ple is the World Trade Organization (WTO) whose primary function 
is said to be one of ensuring free and orderly trade among states.  
The desire for forming larger unions is informed by the fact that 
many issues—e.g. economic, security, and environmental—are in-
creasingly proving to be beyond the capacity of one state, even a 
relatively powerful one, to deal with.4 
On the other hand, globalization seems also to lead to more frag-
mentation where groups (ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious) seek to 
reassert their “local” (as opposed to “national”) identities as more 
secure sources of belonging in this globalized world of uncertainty 
or, to borrow a phrase from W.H. Auden, in “an age of anxiety.”5  
The most virulent attempts to slow down the speed of globalization 
have taken the forms of religious and ethnic fundamentalism.6 
I think the late great anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, was correct 
in his observation that the world is “growing both more global and 
more divided, more thoroughly interconnected and more intricately 
partitioned, at the same time.  As the one increases, so does the 
other.”7  One does not need to agree with Geertz that there is a one-
to-one correlation between interconnection and partition to embrace 
his general point that interconnection and partition have defined 
globalization.  This, of course, makes the issues of identity and be-
longing rather complicated and an important subject of inquiry.8 
                                                      
4 The idea that even a powerful state needs legal cooperation and coordination 
to deal with global problems that affect it was expressed long ago by Hugo Grotius.  
See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 9 (Louise R Loomis trans., Walter J. 
Black Inc. 1949) (1625) (“[T]here is no state so strong that it may not some time need 
the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade or to defend itself 
against the combined hosts of a number of other nations joined against it.”). 
5 W. H. Auden, The Age of Anxiety, in COLLECTED POEMS 447 (Edward Mendel-
son ed., First Vintage Int’l Ed. 1991) (1976). 
6 William Connolly, Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism, 28 POL. 
THEORY 596, 598 (2000). 
7 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AVAILABLE LIGHT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON 
PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 246 (1998).   
8 SHEILA L. CROUCHER, GLOBALIZATION AND BELONGING: THE POLITICS OF 
IDENTITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 35 (2004) (“[S]o much of the subject matter that cur-
rently consumes scholars and politicians can be characterized in relation to ques-
tions of belonging and identity. Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, 
Northern Ireland, and Rwanda, while profoundly complicated in their origins and 
contemporary manifestations, are poignant examples of the power and passion that 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
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Second, new communication technologies—especially the Inter-
net and satellite television—have enabled individuals to cultivate 
forms of belonging and membership that could not have been pos-
sible or even imagined a few years ago.  Alternative forms of belong-
ing have opened up the possibility of multiple and overlapping 
communities to which one may belong.  The consequence of this is 
the emergence of overlapping and ambiguous identities.  But there 
is another, often darker side to the communication revolution: It has 
enabled people to think of the purity of communities.  We tailor our 
communities in the same way that we tailor the information we seek 
to consume.9  Indeed, the two cultivate one another.  “People live sep-
arately together,” explained a Rwandan soldier discussing the ambig-
uous relationship among Rwandans in the aftermath of the geno-
cide.10  The idea of the purity of communities has often been the 
prelude to the elimination of those who are thought to make those 
communities impure.  There is yet another dark side of the commu-
nication revolution.  It enables members of perpetrator communities 
to destroy their victim communities more quickly and more effi-
ciently so as to establish their “pure” communities rather quickly.  
                                                      
surround belonging.”).  Technically, “belonging” and “identity” refer to two differ-
ent states of affairs.  “Belonging” refers to the act or process of joining the “Us” 
while identity relies on the existence of the “Other.”  That is, “belonging” needs an 
“Us” and identity a “Them.”  But there is no way of thinking about an “Us” without 
simultaneously thinking about a “Them.”  Therefore, identity and belonging cover 
the same area (boundary) but from different angles or starting points.  
9 To see how many Americans are simply seeking “facts” with which they 
agree and listening to or associating mostly only with those with whom they have 
ideological affinity, see Amy Mitchell, et. al., Political Polarization & Media Habits, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.journal-
ism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/ 
[https://perma.cc/YCT8-R9R4]; Rem Rieder, Just the “Facts,” Please, U.S.A. TODAY, 
Oct. 21, 2014, at 2B, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/column-
ist/rieder/2014/10/21/polarized-media-habits-among-liberals-conserva-
tives/17619635/ [https://perma.cc/GPG9-HUXN]. 
10 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED 
WITH OUR FAMILIES 34 (1998). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
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After all, what made the Rwandan genocide so efficient was the abil-
ity of Hutus to communicate and coordinate quickly and widely 
during the genocide.11  Communication speed compresses space.12 
Using the crime of genocide as the focus of the inquiry, this arti-
cle makes and defends two claims about communities and belong-
ing.  First, it argues that as perverse as it sounds, the crime of geno-
cide is an “exercise in community building.”13  Often, when we think 
about communities we think of positive sentiments, but common 
criminality is also a form of building solidarity and community.  The 
obvious example is the formation of gangs, but it happens in grave 
circumstances involving mass atrocities as well.  The community 
                                                      
11 Philip Gourevitch described the Rwanda genocide as “the most efficient 
mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”  GOUREVITCH, 
supra note 10, at 3.  Mass communication was used to identify the places that Tutsis 
were hiding and to communicate to perpetrators how to get to them. Samantha 
Power, Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC, Sep. 2001, at 17, http://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q8NU-NRL7] (“[L]ists of [Tutsi] targets had been prepared in 
advance, and Radio Mille Collines broadcast names, addresses, and even license-
plate numbers. Killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in 
the other.”).  There is of course another aspect of the role of communication in the 
genocidal acts that I shall not explore here.  The Rwanda genocide was at least 
partly instigated by Hutu radio propaganda that continuously depicted Tutsis as 
the evil that had brought untold misery on the Hutu community. Prosecutor v. Na-
himana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶1031 (Dec. 3, 2003), 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-52/trial-
judgements/en/031203.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG4J-XTZX] (“RTML broadcast-
ing was a drumbeat, calling on listeners to take action against the enemy. . .. The 
nature of radio transmission made RTML, particularly dangerous and harmful, as 
did the breadth of its reach.”).  The issue of how much of such propaganda should 
be tolerated is often a difficult issue for severely fractured societies.  For the issue 
as to if and when such propaganda should be restricted, see Joshua Wallenstein, 
Punishing Words: An Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of Causation in Prosecutions 
for Incitement to Genocide, 54 STAN. L. REV. 351, 388–97 (2001) (explaining that the 
propaganda must cause direct and public incitement to commit genocide); Marlise 
Simons, Trial Centers on Role of Press During Rwanda Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/03/world/trial-centers-on-role-of-
press-during-rwanda-massacre.html [https://perma.cc/C6R5-TU5Y] (explaining 
at what point political propaganda become criminal). 
12 Connolly, Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 6, at 
597–98.  Connolly relies on Paul Virilio’s work to make the observation that “[when] 
speed accelerates, space is compressed.” 
13 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 95.  I must note here that the argument that 
genocide is an exercise in community building is not meant to suggest that that is 
the only or exclusive purpose for which genocide is committed.  That, of course, 
cannot be.  There are multiple other purposes—such as social or political power—
that are motivators of genocidaires.  The argument, however, is that the notion of 
community is one factor and perhaps the factor that underlies many of these other 
purposes.  
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“that slays together stays together.”14  And in a world of dislocation 
and anxiety, atrocities such as genocide may, in the future, occur 
more frequently than we imagine.15  Furthermore, perhaps contrary 
to most people’s intuitions, the argument in this article is that geno-
cide does not occur in a world of no-law, but is in fact often preceded 
by all sorts of law that marks the target as different and prepares its 
elimination.  Recognizing this fact, I shall argue later, will ensure 
that we know what and when we should monitor to prevent geno-
cidal breaks. 
The second, and the more positive, at least the more hopeful, 
claim that the article makes and defends is this: if genocide is a (per-
verse) process in community building, then the international re-
sponse to it, either to forestall it or to punish perpetrators, is also a 
way (perhaps a test) of how we imagine the contours of the interna-
tional community, the community of humankind.16  The article will 
                                                      
14 See David Cesarani, Book Review, 45 CENT. EUR. HIST. 162 (2012) (reviewing 
THOMAS KÜHNE, BELONGING AND GENOCIDE: HITLER’S COMMUNITY, 1918–1945 
(2010)).  Cesarani expresses Kühne’s thesis this way: “The nation that slays together, 
stays together.”  
15 What one sees in several African countries and the Middle East (especially 
the Middle East) is that the nation-state is fragmenting along ethnic and religious 
lines.  See Liz Sly, How the Battle Against the Islamic State is Redrawing the Map of the 
Middle East, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2015, at A1, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/on-the-front-lines-of-the-war-against-the-islamic-state-a-tan-
gled-web/2015/12/30/d944925a-9244-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KA8F-CVDC].  And as a consequence, the threat of ethnic 
cleansing and genocide are ever present.  What ISIS and al Qaeda have been doing 
to religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria is a clear example of the geno-
cidal threat that follows the breakups of nation-states.  See, e.g., Nursa Front Targets 
Syria Druse Minority, THE WALL ST. J., June 12, 2015, at A8 (“Sunni Islamist groups 
in Syria and Iraq such as Islamic State have targeted Druse, Yazidi and Christian 
minorities as well as Shiite Muslims and Syrian President Bashir al-Assad’s Shiite-
linked Alawite sect as sectarian-fueled fighting rages across both countries.”); Chip 
Carey, Syria’s Civil War Has Become a Genocide, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Sept. 16, 2013 
12:00 AM); Mark Levene, Genocidal Legacies of the Great War: Legacies of 1914, 113 
CURRENT HIST. 318, 318 (2014); Matthew Krain, J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming 
Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides? 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 574, 574 
(2012) (“Genocides and politicides, atrocities unparalleled in humanity, were regu-
lar features of the international political landscape of the twentieth century.  There 
is no reason to expect that they will cease to be recurrent problems in the twenty-
first century”) (citations omitted). 
16 Let me at the outset note that the claim that I shall make in this article that 
outside responses to genocide (whether the response is multilateral or unilateral) 
are ways of imagining the international community is not to suggest that that is the 
only way people understand or should understand what the phrase “international 
community” means.  There are multiple ways in which the notion of “the interna-
tional community” is understood; the one that this article advocates is simply one 
way of thinking about the international community.  For various ways in which the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
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explore this second thesis using two international legal doctrines—
universal jurisdiction and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—
which have been adopted to deal with mass atrocities or grave 
crimes.  The two doctrines are the two ends of the spectrum of what 
I shall call a shared responsibility17 to protect people from mass 
atrocities (R2P) and to punish perpetrators of such atrocities (uni-
versal jurisdiction).  So, to put it simply, this article is about how 
communities are imagined both in their destructive and constitutive 
sense and what we may need to do to minimize the destructive 
tendencies and enhance the affirmative and positive dimensions. 
The article is organized in the following manner.  Section 2 in-
troduces the crime of genocide and how it is legally defined both as 
a matter of conventional and customary law.  In the process, the sec-
tion notes that there is an international consensus on the need to 
fight this “crime of crimes,” as it is often referred to, both at the na-
tional and international level.  Section 3 develops the argument that 
genocide is a process of community building and responds to poten-
tial critics who may view the idea of associating genocide with any 
notion of community implausible or even perverse.  Section 4 makes 
the argument, perhaps against many people’s intuitions, that geno-
cide does not occur when law does not function, rather genocide and 
other mass crimes are often preceded by and their occurrences facil-
itated by all sorts of law.  Section 5, which forms the heart of the 
article, explores the proposition that the international responses to 
genocide—represented by R2P and universal jurisdiction—are not 
simply instrumental (preventing or punishing genocide), but also 
have constitutive dimensions.  They are partly processes through 
which the identity of the international community is imagined.  The 
section asserts and defends the proposition that the international 
community so imagined is a community that is diverse and vulner-
able.  Section 6 explores the relationship between genocide and an-
other part of the international community, international civil soci-
ety.  The role of civil society in monitoring and reporting on possible 
or actual genocide is crucial in how effectively national or interna-
tional public institutions respond to threats of genocide or punish-
ing genocidaires. 
                                                      
notion of the international community has been understood see William E. Conklin, 
The Exclusionary Boundary of the Early Modern International Community, 81 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 133 (2012). 
17 For the idea of shared responsibility, see infra pages 45–46.  
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Section 7, the concluding section, is a backward glance highlight-
ing some of the arguments made in the article.  Specifically, it notes 
that when the international community responds to the threat of the 
“very existence of certain human groups” and when it punishes 
those who have perpetrated the crime of genocide, it endorses “the 
most elementary principles” that are the foundation of an interna-
tional community: a community of diverse peoples who are united 
in their very humanity and vulnerability.  When we take responsi-
bility for the genocidal crimes of others through declarations such 
as “genocide is a crime against all of us” and make the perpetrators 
accountable for those crimes through the doctrines of universal ju-
risdiction and R2P we imagine or constitute “humanity.”  When we 
“share the onus of evil committed by others,” we “become members 
of humanity.”18  The Conclusion adds that if genocide is an attack 
on all of us, as international law provides, then not to respond to 
genocidal attacks or threatened attacks is to bring into question the 
validity or sincerity of that legal claim and even more to send a sig-
nal to others that genocidal attacks can go on with impunity.  That 
point was not lost on Adolf Hitler.19 
Before I explore the issue of genocide as a process of community 
building and the international response to it as a way of imagining 
the international community, in the next section I will briefly outline 
what the crime of genocide entails. 
 
2.  GENOCIDE:  A (NOT SO) BRIEF OUTLINE 
 
Referred to as the “crime of crimes,”20 genocide is regarded as 
the gravest of international crimes.21  It is prohibited by both con-
ventional and customary law.  In terms of conventional law, the 
                                                      
18 David Luban, Arendt on the Crime of Crimes, 28 RATIO JURIS 307, 320 (2015).  
19 See infra note 225 and the text accompanying it.  
20 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF 
CRIMES 227 (2d ed. 2009).  Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judge-
ment and Sentence, ¶ 451 (Dec. 6, 1999) (“[T]he Chamber is of the opinion that gen-
ocide constitutes the ‘crime of crimes’, which must be taken into account when de-
ciding the sentence.”).  
21 The term “genocide” is made up of the Greek genos which means race or 
tribe and the Latin cide which refers to killing.  The term “genocide” was coined by 
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish lawyer who lost his entire family except his 
brother in the Holocaust.  Lemkin, a refugee from Poland, worked in the United 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
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Convention on Genocide is the point of departure.  In its preamble, 
the Convention makes the obvious historical observation that “at all 
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on human-
ity.”22  Giving confirmation to that assertion, Ben Kiernan in an out-
standing study has explored the costs of genocide on humanity from 
classical Greece down to the last known genocide of the 21st cen-
tury.23 
Article II of that Genocide Convention defines genocide as en-
gaging in certain acts such as killing and causing serious bodily in-
jury that target listed protected groups “with the intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part,” those groups.24  Members of the targeted group 
are marked or chosen on the basis of their group membership.  This 
definition is reproduced in the statutes of the two well-known ad 
hoc Tribunals established by the Security Council of the United Na-
tions25 as well as the Rome Statute that established the International 
                                                      
States War Department. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS (1944).  
22 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide pmbl., 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Convention on Genocide].  
23 See BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND 
EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR (2007) (examining genocide incidents from 
the classical era to the present, focusing on worldwide colonial exterminations and 
twentieth-century case studies including the Armenian genocide, the Nazi Holo-
caust, Stalin’s mass murders, and the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides).  As I 
shall indicate later, the term “genocide” was coined in early twentieth century and 
Kiernan is affixing retroactively that label on earlier events. For many of the events 
he describes, the label genocide fits well, but not for all.   
24 See Convention on Genocide, supra note 22, at art. 2.  
Article II provides: 
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group, as such: 
a. Killing members of the group; 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
As it is clear from the definition, genocide has physical element (the actus reus) and 
the mental element (mens rea).  The mental element has two aspects to it:  a narrow 
intent (to do the specific physical harms) and the broader intent (to destroy the 
group as such).  The narrow intent is in the service of the broader intent.  Both as-
pects of the intent have to be present for there to be the crime of genocide. 
25 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991, at art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1993) available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf 
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Criminal Court.26  As Article I of the Convention provides, genocide 
may be committed in times of war or peace27 and it requires no state 
action.28 
Genocide is also prohibited under customary international law.  
Indeed, the prohibition of genocide is on the list of peremptory 
norms (jus cogens)29 whose violators are referred to as hostis humani 
generis (enemies of humankind).30  Various international tribunals 
have affirmed the view that the crime of genocide is prohibited un-
der customary international law.  Thus, the International Court of 
Justice in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)31 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in several cases32 have both con-
cluded that the prohibition of genocide is most certainly a principle 
                                                      
[https://perma.cc/2VUZ-4F2N] (defining genocide and the acts punishable as 
such); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955, 32 I.L.M. II92, (1994) available at http://www.securitycouncilre-
port.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IJ%20SRES955.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD4M-YHWS] (defin-
ing genocide and the acts punishable as such). 
26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9B3-C8CM]. 
27 Convention on Genocide, supra note 22, at art. 1 (“The Contracting Parties 
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a 
crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”). 
28 Id. at art. 4.  
29 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J 6, 31–32 ¶ 64 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter 
Armed Activities in Congo] (“the principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention 
are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even 
without any conventional obligation”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702 cmt (showing how the prohibition 
against genocide is recognized as customary international law).  
30 Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
31 Armed Activities in Congo, supra note 29 at ¶ 161; see also Reservations to 
the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (“[T]he principles underlying the Convention 
are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even 
without any conventional obligation.”).  
32 See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 88, (May 
21, 1999) (“[T]he crime of genocide is considered part of international customary 
law and, moreover, a norm of jus cogens.”); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 
96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 46 (Dec. 6, 1999) (“The Genocide Convention is 
undeniably considered part of customary international law . . . .”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
  
2017] Genocide and Belonging 1053 
of customary international law.  Several nation-states have also en-
acted legislation on the suppression and prosecution of genocidal 
crimes, more or less adopting the international definition of the 
crime33, which of course strengthens the argument that genocide is 
indeed a crime under customary international law. 
However, even with such international consensus about the 
gravity of the crime and the commitment on the part of the interna-
tional community to prevent and punish, genocide continues to oc-
cur.34  More than 100,000 Hutus perished in Burundi in 1972.  The 
International Court has concluded that genocide was committed 
during the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s.35  And, of course, the most 
efficient genocide occurred more recently in Rwanda, a genocide 
that resulted in the murder of about 800,000 people (mainly Tutsis) 
in less than 100 days36—slaughtered by Hutus, not just militants, but 
“ordinary” Hutus.37  It is the ordinary face of evil that often shocks 
us, for we expect evil to appear in different, monstrous forms.38  It is 
                                                      
33 See SCHABAS, supra note 20, at 5 (“A large number of States have enacted 
legislation concerning the prosecution and suppression of genocide, mostly by 
amending their penal or criminal code in order to add a distinct offense.”). 
34 Bradley Campbell, Genocide as Social Control, 27 SOC. THEORY 150, 151 (2009).  
35 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 118, at ¶ 376 (Feb. 3); 
Martin Mennecke, Genocidal Violence in the Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia Herzegovina, in 
CENTURIES OF GENOCIDE: ESSAYS AND EYEWITNESSES ACCOUNTS 477, 495 (Samuel Tot-
ten & William S. Parsons eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
36 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 133 (“Take the best estimate: eight hundred 
thousand killed in a hundred days. That’s three hundred and thirty-three and a 
third murder an hour—or five and a half lives terminated every minute.”); 
KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 559 (“[H]alf a million to 1 million people [were] mur-
dered in just three or four months.”). 
37  A Seventh-Day Adventist pastor, Catholic nuns, a female government min-
ister who was in charge of family issues and family welfare, a mayor on whom 
many relied to give them protection, etc. were accused and convicted of genocide.  
Gourevitch makes the point this way: “Neighbors hacked neighbors to death in 
their homes, and colleagues hacked colleagues to death in their workplaces. Priests 
killed their parishioners, elementary-school teachers killed their students.”  Philip 
Gourevitch, Letter From Rwanda: After the Genocide, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 1995, 
at 3, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/12/18after-the-genocide 
[https://perma.cc/YB4G-QNT9]. 
38 See Saira Mohamed, Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Matt Atroc-
ity, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1165, 1208–1215 (2015) (“We are expected to see per-
petrators as different, and courts and observers treat them as different.  But perpe-
trators are not simply monsters . . . .  Acknowledging their humanity might be 
alarming; it forces us to reckon with the idea that, if they are capable of committing 
these horrors, then perhaps we all might be able to do the same.”).  In other words, 
viewing perpetrators of crimes like genocide as uniquely monstrous allows us to 
shield ourselves from the horrible thought that we might be capable of committing 
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to capture and highlight the ordinary face of evil, the fact that the 
great evils in history, including the Holocaust, were executed not by 
fanatics and psychopaths but by ordinary people that Hannah Ar-
endt subtitled her report on the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem as a 
“Report on the Banality of Evil.”39 
Even more worryingly, there are a number of countries that are 
or ought to be on genocide watch40, for there are deep ethnic or reli-
gious-based fractures which can, at any time, ignite into a full-scale 
genocide and ethnic cleansing.41  The United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral was perhaps a bit too pessimistic, but he had a point when he 
                                                      
such horrendous crimes.  It is, as Mohamed sees it, “a comforting message.”  Id. at 
1211. 
39 See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY 
OF EVIL (1963) (observing that that Eichmann was not a fanatic or psychopath, but 
an extremely average person who relied on clichéd defenses rather than thinking 
for himself and was motivated by professional promotion rather than ideology).; 
see also GEORGES BATAILLE, EROTICISM 186 (Mary Dalwood trans., 1987) (noting that 
despite many people’s desire to distinguish between the civilized “us” and those 
other “barbarians,” “observation shows that the same peoples are alternatively bar-
barous and civilized in their attitude . . . .  [A]ll civilized men are capable of sav-
agery.”); see also Dan Stone, Genocide as Transgression, 7 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 45, 46 
(2004) (“Academics believe that they have seen thorough [the] Hollywood misrep-
resentation, and know that, in reality, the horror of the Holocaust consists not in 
the fact that the murderers were so ‘mad, so bestial, driven by blood lust, but in the 
fact that the murderers were frighteningly like ourselves.  The machinery of de-
struction meant that people could be ‘disposed of’ by ‘desk-killers’ like Eichmann, 
in a clam, industrial, production-line system of death.”).  Stone faults academics 
who think thusly for implying that “the mere use of technology with the absence of 
passion.” Id. at 47.  
40 A good example is the Central African Republic where there has been seri-
ous sectarian violence (Muslims v. Christians) which a senior United Nations offi-
cial characterized as being “the seeds of a genocide.” Somini Sengupta, High Blood-
shed Amid Ghosts of Rwanda and Bosnia, N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2013, at A5, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/africa/stopping-bloodshed-in-
the-central-african-republic-amid-ghosts-of-genocide.html 
[https://perma.cc/8GCK-TUJ9].  But there are many others, perhaps even includ-
ing Burundi.  There is currently an electoral crisis in Burundi that is displacing tens 
of thousands people and sending them to neighboring countries.  As the Washing-
ton Post in its editorial noted, the “political crisis could devolve into tragic reprise 
of ethnic conflict between Burundi’s Hutu majority and Tutsi minority.” An Elec-
toral Crisis in Burundi, Wash. Post, May 9, 2015, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/an-electoral-crisis-in-burundi/2015/05/09/6d7a1e7e-
f581-11e4-b2f3-af5479e6bbdd_story.html?utm_term=.b1e8549e6945 
[https://perma.cc/SP53-YZL6]. 
41 Ethnic cleansing is “the forced displacement” of civilians. Application of 
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment 2007 I.C.J. 43, 64 at ¶ 161 (Feb. 26).  By that defi-
nition, what happened to Native American in the early years of the Republic was 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
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observed that “[n]o part of the world can consider itself immune to 
the risk of genocide.”42 
The destructive dimension of genocide is apparent to all, but 
what I shall claim here is that there is another, constitutive (perverse, 
to be sure) dimension to which scholars have not paid sufficient at-
tention.  An understanding of this phenomenon I claim will enable 
us to respond to the threats of genocide more effectively, for we will 
better understand the conditions that lead to genocidal events. 
In his detailed and lucid account of the Rwanda Genocide, Philip 
Gourevitch makes the rather arresting but unexplained and passing 
observation that “[g]enocide, after all is an exercise in community 
building.”43  Many will surely dispute this statement on at least two 
grounds.  First, critics may resist the notion that communities can be 
defined by other than positive sentiments.  Second, skeptics may 
view a “chicken and egg” problem in the assertion.  Which came 
first, the community or the genocide?  The critique here is that gen-
ocide is simply a consequence of existing conflicting communities 
rather than a condition giving rise to communities.  People engage 
in acts of genocide, critics may argue, because they believe that the 
community to which they have imagined to belong can only be sus-
tained through a form of purification—the removal of the Other 
from one’s presence. 
In the next section, I shall first argue that these challenges are 
misplaced and then go on to develop an argument that supports the 
proposition that genocide, as perverse as it is, is indeed an exercise 
in community building and a process of firming up a particular un-
derstanding of belonging.  Genocide is a pivotal event which is both 
a consequence and a cause of imagining communities in a certain 
                                                      
indeed ethnic cleansing.  See KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 320, 327 (“Over time, [Pres-
ident] Jefferson’s project for Indians ranged widely, from a peaceable assimilation 
with white America farmers to what we would now call ethnic ‘cleansing’ of Indi-
ans, first in wartime, then in peace, and extending to extermination if he deemed it 
necessary.”).  Although the term “ethnic cleansing” entered popular consciousness 
during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, it was apparently coined by the Nazis in 1939–
40.  See id. at 440 (“In 1939–40, Hitler and other leading Nazis coined the term ethnic 
cleansing (völkische Flurbereinigung).  The ‘cleansed’ occupied areas of Jews and were 
obsessed with the concept of racial ‘purity.”). 
42 Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the International Confer-
ence on the Prevention of Genocide (April 1, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7555 
[https://perma.cc/G688-NKYX]). 
43 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 95.  The statement was not explained or devel-
oped.  It appeared to be a throwaway observation. 
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way.  To be sure, the community imagined is perversely premised 
on the negation of the very existence of the target community, but it 
would be a mistake not to realize or take seriously the idea that a 
version of belonging (distorted as it is) is at play when the “crime of 
crimes” is committed.  It is far too easy to attribute genocide to fa-
natics and psychopaths, but that will neither help us to fully under-
stand the nature of the impulse to destroy nor enable us to respond 
to it more fully and successfully. 
In the last paragraph, I used the phrase “imagining communi-
ties” so let me briefly note here what I mean by this notion.  The idea 
of “imagined communities” is that of Benedict Anderson’s who 
coined the phrase to describe the nation.44  Anderson did not use the 
phrase to suggest that the communities so imagined (including the 
nation) are false or fabricated.  Indeed, Anderson observes that “all 
communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact 
(and perhaps even these) are imagined.”45  Why does he think they 
are imagined?  They are imagined because members of those com-
munities “will never know their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”46  Anderson’s claim of imagined communities also 
suggests that “belonging” is not something that simply or ontologi-
cally happens, but something that is achieved.47 
For Anderson, “communities are to be distinguished, not by 
their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imag-
ined.”48  As I shall show in the next section, genocide is one way 
(albeit an abhorrent way) of imagining a community and belonging.  
In the sections that follow I shall also argue that the international 
community’s response to the threats or acts of genocide (either 
through universal jurisdiction or R2P) is also a way of imagining a 
community—a very different community, a counter community to 
the supposed pure community of which the genocidaire fantasizes.  
R2P and universal jurisdiction affirm and embrace hybridity. 
                                                      
44 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2d ed. 1991). 
45 Id. at 6.  
46 Id. 
47 Vikki Bell, Performative and Belonging: An Introduction, 16 THEORY, CULTURE 
AND SOC’Y. 1, 3 (1999) (“It is worth reiterating that the collection begins from a po-
sition which insists that one does not simply or ontologically “belong” to the world 
or to any group within it. Belonging is an achievement at several levels of abstrac-
tion.”). 
48 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 6. 
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3.  GENOCIDE AND THE PROCESS OF IMAGINING COMMUNITIES 
 
3.1.  Communities and Positive Sentiments 
 
As noted earlier, the first challenge to the assertion that genocide 
is an exercise in community building is premised on the proposition 
that community is a notion constituted only by positive senti-
ments.49  This critique is easy to counter.  There is nothing that con-
ceptually compels us to think of communities as organized only by 
positive sentiments or commitments.  After all, the word “commu-
nity” is derived from the Latin communicare, which simply means 
“to share, to join and to unite.”50  To be sure, positive sentiments will 
always form part of the motivation for engaging in an exercise in 
community building, but one can cite many communities whose pri-
mary organizing principles are less than admirable or virtuous.  In-
deed, this was Adolf Hitler’s point when he opined that “common 
criminality”51 is one way to build communities.  There are two ways 
of looking at the role negative sentiments play in the construction or 
imagining of communities.  The first is in circumstances where the 
predominant impulse that gathers members into a unit is such a sen-
timent.  A good example is a criminal gang or “common criminal-
ity,” as Hitler referred to it.  I say the “predominant sentiment” be-
cause even under these circumstances there is often a sense of 
belonging at play where members use these common criminal en-
terprises as a way of forging solidarity that they might have thought 
was unavailable to them elsewhere.  The second way to look at the 
                                                      
49 It is important to note here that even those who believe that communities 
are on the whole motivated and constituted by positive sentiments do not deny that 
some communities fail while others succeed.  So, the argument against communi-
ties as positive projects is not an argument that some communities in fact fail to 
achieve the sentiments that brought members together, but rather the argument is 
that members that attempt to constitute a community may also be motivated by less 
than admirable sentiments and they may in fact be successful communities in their 
own terms. 
50 Peter Gould, Dynamics Structures of Geographic Space, in COLLAPSING SPACE 
AND TIME: GEOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 3 (1991) (de-
scribing the roots of the word “communication”). 
51 Norman H. Baynes, 1 The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939 75 
(1942) (“There are two things which can unite men: common ideals and common 
criminality”), cited in THOMAS KÜHNE, BELONGING AND GENOCIDE: HITLER’S 
COMMUNITY, 1918–1945 91 (2010).  An example of a community built on common 
criminality is a criminal gang. 
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issue of negative sentiments is to argue that every community, even 
when primarily motivated by positive sentiments, is secondarily 
about defining itself against the Other, other communities and other 
groups.  Identities, whether individual or communal, are always de-
fined in relation to or in contrast with others—other individuals and 
other communities.52  In that process there will necessarily be nega-
tive sentiments that will play a role to one degree or another.  In 
Rwanda, being a Hutu was partly defined as “not being a Tutsi”53 
and being a Hindu in India is in part understood as “not being a 
Muslim.” 
To summarize, whether negative sentiments play a primary or 
secondary role, such sentiments play a part in the constitution or 
imagining of communities.  The notion that communities can be or-
ganized only around positive sentiments is neither logically nor em-
pirically defensible. 
 
3.2.  Communities and Consequences 
 
The second challenge is a more serious one.  Genocide, the argu-
ment goes, cannot be an exercise in community building, for geno-
cidal events take place because there are already communities which are 
at odds with (or hate) one another.  According to this view, genocide 
is a consequence of, not an exercise in, community building. 
There is some truth to this observation.  Often, both the victims 
and the victimizers have organized themselves into distinct commu-
nities prior to the genocidal encounter.  That is, there is already some 
sense of group membership and belonging when genocides take 
place.  There was a Jewish community in Germany and Eastern Eu-
rope prior to the Holocaust.  There was a Tutsi community prior to 
the Rwanda genocide, and an Armenian community preceding the 
                                                      
52 See Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minori-
ties, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1219, 1226 (1992) (explaining that group identities are 
established in relation to others and other groups); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, 
THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 163 (1996) (arguing that boundaries make individual 
and collective identities possible, but they also “close off possibilities of being that 
might otherwise flourish.”  Closing off possibilities does not simply restrict free-
dom to establish other forms of communities, but at times lead to the destruction of 
existing communities as well.  Therefore, boundaries play a paradoxical role:  they 
affirm and restrict or destroy freedom.).  
53 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 50 (explaining that “[A] Hutu was what a 
Tutsi was not, and vice versa.”).  
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Armenian genocide (the first known genocide of the 20th century).54  
The existence of the group may be a matter of self-perception as well 
as perception by others.  That is, members see themselves as a unit 
and others also see them as a unit.  At times, the solidity of the group 
might be more a construction put by others than members them-
selves.  Thus, for example, many Hutus saw Tutsis as alien in the 
literal sense—as invaders and conquerors of Hutu land—even 
though there was no historical evidence for such a claim.55  For the 
genocidaire, his perception of the existence of the group and his 
judgment of the threat that the group poses to the community to 
which he belongs are sufficient bases for genocidal intent or act.  It 
may be immaterial whether the members of the victim group saw 
themselves as a group or whether they genuinely pose a threat to 
the genocidaire group. 
                                                      
54 The Armenian genocide began on April 24, 1915 and lasted until 1923.  See 
Rouben P. Adalian, The Armenian Genocide, in CENTURIES OF GENOCIDE: ESSAYS AND 
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 117 (Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons eds., 4th ed., 
2013) (providing the dates and details of the Armenian genocide).  There is no con-
sensus on the exact number of victims of the Armenian genocide.  The estimates 
range from 600,000 to 1.5 million.  See KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 415 (providing 
victim estimates).  Although Turkey had generally been successful in making sure 
the world did not recognize the massacre of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during 
the WWI era as a genocide, recent statements, including one by Pope Francis, seem 
to suggest that the tide is turning.  See Jim Yardley and Sebnem Arsu, Pope Calls 
Killing of Armenians “Genocide,” Provoking Turkish Anger, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/world/europe/pope-calls-killings-of-
armenians-genocide-provoking-turkish-anger.html [https://perma.cc/7M3Z-
3RK6] (Last visiting Mar. 6, 2017) (“Pope Francis on Sunday described the World 
War I-era slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks as the first genocide of the 
20th century, igniting a diplomatic confrontation with Turkey, which quickly sum-
moned the Vatican’s ambassador to condemn the pontiff’s remarks and recalled its 
own ambassador to the Holy See.”).  The German Parliament more recently recog-
nized the Armenian genocide, not unexpectedly leading to protest from Turkey.  
Alison Smale & Melissa Eddy, German Parliament Recognizes Armenian Genocide, An-
gering Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2016, https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/armenian-genocide-germany-turkey.html 
[perma.cc/QR3Q-CCWM].  Turkey continues to deny that the killings during the 
war can be characterized as genocide. Tim Arango, A Century After a Genocide, Tur-
key’s Denial Only Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2015, at A1 (“It also remains that 
conflict’s most bitterly contested legacy, having been met by the Turkish authorities 
with 100 years of silence and denial.”). 
55 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 53 (describing the mindset of the individ-
uals within the conflict); see also ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY:  
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 79–81 (1999) (describing the false portrayal of Tutsis that led 
to massacres); and KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 555 (pointing out historical develop-
ments that influenced the perceptions of Tutsis by Hutus); but see generally ADAM 
JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2006). 
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However the group is constructed, critics of the idea of genocide 
as an exercise in community building ask:  how could genocide be 
understood other than an act that follows and is premised on the 
existence of communities at odds with one another? 
There are two responses to this claim.  The first is conceptual, the 
second is empirical. First, to view communities and their actions 
only in terms of cause and consequence is to have an unsatisfactory 
view of communities.  Only if one views communities as solid and 
stable would one believe that the acts of communities do not have 
an impact on the nature and character of those very communities.  
The fact of the matter is that every major encounter among commu-
nities reshapes or recasts those communities.  The more major the 
encounter or event, the more likely the effect on the nature and char-
acter of the community will be greater and more pronounced.56  
Genocide is one of those events.  What genocide does is of course 
take the notion of the purity of communities to another level.  It is 
not just about forcing the Other from a particular territory, but ra-
ther eliminating it altogether.57  This affects the nature of the com-
munity in one of two ways.  The first and most obvious way is the 
sense that genocide is intended to reestablish the perpetrator com-
munity as a pure community both in the territorial and existential 
sense.  Indeed, the process is sometimes carried out in a context 
where members of the victim community are not even described as 
members of the human species.  During the Rwanda genocide, for 
example, Hutus referred to the Tutsis they were slaying as “cock-
roaches.”58  Armenians were termed “tubercular microbes” during 
                                                      
56 See Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minori-
ties, supra note 52, at 1226 .  See also Adeno Addis, Community and Jurisdictional Au-
thority, in BEYOND EXTRATERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN 
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 32 (Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen 
eds. 2012) (arguing that communities “change in the process of interacting with 
other communities, in the same way that individual identities change in the course 
of individuals interacting with other individuals.”) 
57 The tragic consequence of thinking in terms of pure communities is, of 
course, not limited to ethnic or religious conflicts.  To some extent, what was tragic 
about communism of the twentieth century was precisely the pseudo-revolutionary 
thinking that the communist utopia was a purified form of community where cer-
tain individuals do not have a place. 
58 A local Rwandan radio station apparently incited the Hutus to violence:  
“You have to kill the Tutsis, they’re cockroaches.”  Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of 
Slaughter, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
26875506 [https://perma.cc/LJA5-WRB8].  See GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 3 
(“‘You cockroaches must know that you are made of flesh,’ a broadcaster at Radio 
Mille Collines proclaimed, ‘We won’t let you kill. We will kill you.’”).  This, of 
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the Armenian genocide.59  Hitler spoke of the “Jewish virus,”60 and 
the extermination of Australian Aborigines was compared to the 
“drainage of marshes” and “the disappearance of wild animals.”61  
Such references allow the members of the perpetrator community to 
empty themselves of any sense of empathy to the extent that hu-
mans might have been owed some empathy.  Animal imagery al-
lows perpetrators to maintain “psychological distance from their 
victims and from the nature of their tasks as killers.”62 
If the victim community survives, the relationship between 
those communities (perpetrators and victims) is obviously drasti-
cally changed.  The way those communities view each other will be 
entirely and radically different—not only in terms of how each com-
munity sees the other, but also how each community sees itself as 
                                                      
course, was not the first time the term “cockroach” had been used by Hutus to de-
scribe Tutsis.  It had apparently been used for a long time.  See Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 90 (Sept. 2, 1998) (when a conflict 
started between Hutus and Tutsis almost immediately after independence, Hutus 
used the word Inyenzi, meaning cockroach, to refer to Tutsi exiles who made in-
cursions into Rwanda).  Other references and imagery were also employed in the 
purification process, such as “bush clearing” and “pulling out the roots of the bad 
weeds.”  See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 142 
(1997); see also KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 558–559 (describing the use of “cockroach” 
to label Tutsis). 
59 Peter Bakalian, The Armenian Genocide and the Modern Age, 20 THE SYDNEY 
PAPERS, 144, 150 (2008).  Apparently, a local politician then rhetorically asked, “isn’t 
it the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?” Id.  
60  HITLER’S TABLE TALK 1941-1944: SECRET CONVERSATIONS 332 (H.R. Trevor-
Roper ed., 2d ed. 2000); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 
71 (1989) (discussing the “Jewish virus”).  Hitler then remarked that “by eliminating 
the pest,” he would do “humanity a service.”  See KIERNAN, supra note 23, at 440 
(“Jews were ‘vermin’ and ‘lice.’”). 
61 D.J. Mulvaney, The Australian Aborigines, 1606-1929, 8 HIST. STUD. 135, 145 
(1958) (citing JR MCCULLOUGH, A DICTIONARY GEOGRAPHICAL, STATISTICAL, AND 
HISTORICAL § 2:230 (London 1847).  For a short account of the genocide in Australia 
with some eyewitness accounts, see generally Tatz, supra note 35, at 55.  
62 Jim Fussell, Indangamuntu 1994: Ten Years Ago in Rwanda This Identity Card 
Cost a Woman Her Life, PREVENT GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.prevent-
genocide.org/edu/pastgenocides/rwanda/indangamuntu.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5KBX-8L47].  Bradley Campbell gives a more comprehensive 
account of “distance” that he claims needs to exist for genocide to occur.  There 
must be “cultural,” “relational,” and “functional” distance between the relevant 
communities for there to be threat of genocide.  Campbell, supra note 34, at 161–165.  
By cultural distance, Campbell meant to refer to “differences in the content of the 
culture.”  Id. at 161. “Relational distance” refers “to the extent to which people par-
ticipate in each other’s lives.” Id. at 162.  And “functional distance” refers to “‘the 
extent to which individuals and groups cooperate with one another economically, 
politically, militarily or otherwise.’” Id. at 164. (citation omitted). 
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well.  And under certain circumstances, the genocide (the event) it-
self, including its memory and commemoration, might become a 
sufficient basis of communion for some members, even if those 
members are no longer adherents to other aspects or rituals of the 
culture.63 
The second response to the challenge is based on an empirical 
claim that participating in certain acts leads to solidarity and com-
munity.  This was Hitler’s point when he opined that common crim-
inality in fact leads to a sense of community and solidarity.64  This is 
clearly the case in relation to criminal gangs.  To some extent that is 
what happens to fighting units in an army as well.  Another example 
is when a young Muslim man or woman in the U.S.,65 U.K., or 
France, often a child of immigrants, is recruited by the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al Qaeda operatives to join them in build-
ing a community.  The promise is that he or she will be a central 
player, not an outsider.  It is not so much the territorial space that 
attracts this young man or woman, but rather the idea of a commu-
nity, and of belonging to and building that community, in the pro-
cess of waging war against the Other.66  That community is going to 
                                                      
63 See Joane Nagel, Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity 
and Culture, 41 SOC. PROBS. 135, 154 (1994) (explaining the influence of memory).  
But, of course, the genocide may unite otherwise diverse members of perpetrators 
as well.  The New York Times reporting on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian 
genocide made the following observation about Turkey’s response of denial:  “In a 
country defined by its divisions between the secular and the religious, rich and 
poor, liberals and conservative, the legacy of the Armenian genocide is a unifying 
issue for Turks.”  Tim Arango, A Century After a Genocide, Turkey’s Denial Only Deep-
ens, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2015, at A1, A8. 
64 See KÜHNE, supra note 14, at 164 (“The conclusion is inescapable: the Nazi 
regime not only propagated a racially defined national community, the Volksge-
meinschaft, but established it as a political, social, and psychological reality, not so 
much by providing Germans with economic benefits or by resolving their class con-
flicts but by making Germans complicit in mass crime.”). 
65 Not long ago, two American teenage girls (of Sudanese and Somali heritage) 
from Denver, Colorado were apprehended in Germany while en route to Syria ap-
parently to join ISIS.  Mike Levine, Pierre Thomas and Clayton Sandell, Three Amer-
ican Girls En Route to Syria Planned to Join Militant Groups, Officials Say, ABC  NEWS, 
Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/american-girls-
en-route-syria-tracked-fbi/story?id=26353762 [https://perma.cc/6U57-CTTN]. 
66 See Danica Kirka, Study Says Girls Seek ‘Sisterhood’—Not Just Jihadi Marriage—
in Islamic State, WASHINGTON POST (May 28, 2015), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2015/may/28/study-says-girls-seek-sisterhood-_-not-just-mar-
ria/ [https://perma.cc/UC86-NB5H] (“The notion that young women are 
traveling to Syria solely to become ‘jihadi brides’ is simplistic and hinders efforts to 
prevent other girls from being radicalized, new research suggests. Young women 
are joining the Islamic State group for many reasons, including anger over the 
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be built by destroying those who are seen to be the outsiders, the 
enemy, those who form the outer boundary of the community to 
which he/she seeks to belong and those who, they are told, will 
eliminate them if they do not help eliminate them first.67  The com-
munity is “a community of fate and struggle” and it is based on the 
idea of the purity of communities.68  One of Jean-Paul Sartre’s com-
pelling insights in Anti-Semite and Jew is that the anti-Semite (and 
one could add any genocidaire) is driven by the extraordinarily fan-
ciful belief that harmony will be re-established once the evil Other 
is eliminated in the same way that a healthy body will be restored 
once a virus is eliminated.69 
The Rwanda genocide offers another and, for our purposes, a 
more relevant example.  The roving bands of Hutus who inflicted 
unimaginable terror for about 100 days were referred to as inte-
rahamwe, “those who attack together.”70  In the process of killing, 
maiming, raping, torturing and disfiguring, the bands of Hutus 
formed what was essentially not very different from a criminal 
band.  The interahamawe did not just attempt to purify the commu-
nity that existed, but to solidify it as well.  Purity is a matter of the 
relationship between the community and the Other (i.e. the other 
community); solidity is a question of how strong the bonds are 
among members of a particular community.  One could view the 
first as a question of dimension and the second as a question of 
                                                      
perceived persecution of Muslims and the wish to belong to a sisterhood with 
similar beliefs, according to a report released Thursday by the Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue and the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s 
College London.”). 
67 In a recent blog, an anthropologist who has “spent much time observing, 
interviewing and carrying out systematic studies among people on six continents 
who are drawn to violent action for a group and its cause” in Iraq “among young 
men who had killed for ISIS” and potential recruits in Paris and barrios of 
Barcelona, made the following observation: these young men knew very little about 
Islam (the Quran and Hadith) or the early caliphates “but had learned of Islam from 
Al Qaeda and ISIS propaganda, teaching that Muslims like them were targeted for 
elimination unless they first eliminated the impure.”  Scott Atran, Here’s What Social 
Science Says About Countering Violent Extremism, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-atran/violent-extremism-social-sci-
ence_b_7142604.html [https://perma.cc/4R49-L77Q] (Last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
68 The irony of imagining purity in a world of hybridity is frighteningly dan-
gerous.  And that, of course, is precisely the problem. 
69 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI SEMITE AND JEW (1948).  
70 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 92. 
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depth.71  Put simply, the community is imagined both in terms of its 
relationship with the other community and the relationship 
amongst its members.  The genocide of the interahamwe cannot be 
understood as collective madness or mob mania, nor a crime of pas-
sion motivated by deep hatred, as some tend to see it.  Rather, it was 
a well-organized and efficiently planned exercise of community 
building with “great ambition.”72  Indeed, that was the conclusion 
that Thomas Kühne reached in his fascinating study of genocide and 
belonging in relation to Hitler’s Germany.73  Sociologists have 
shown that collective violence such as genocide—the process of de-
stroying the symbols, bonds, and identities of the victim groups—
binds the perpetrators to a collectivity and solidifies their identity.74 
Interestingly, it is not just in terms of the process of killing and 
maiming that the Hutu bands saw themselves as a community of 
                                                      
71 For an interesting, but slightly different, account of the dimensions and 
depths of identities, see CONNOLLY, supra note 52, at 46 (explaining how responsi-
bility influences cultural identities). 
72 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 17; see also Fussell, supra note 62 (“The Rwan-
dan genocide was systematic and organized and not an indiscriminate or wanton 
slaughter as it was sometimes later portrayed.”).  For a general and an extended 
assessment of why it is erroneous to think of collective violence, such as riots, as 
collective madness or mania, see generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE DEADLY 
ETHNIC RIOT (2001) (arguing that rioters are not irrational; they choose their targets 
selectively and they employ both emotion and reason to prosecute their plan). 
73 See KÜHNE, supra note 14, at 164 (“The conclusion is inescapable:  the Nazi 
regime not only propagated a racially defined national community, the Volksge-
meinschaft, but established it as a political, social, and psychological reality, not so 
much by providing Germans with economic benefits or by resolving their class con-
flicts but by making Germans complicit in mass crime.”); see also Cesarani, supra 
note 14, at 162 (“‘The nation that slays together, stays together.’  This, in a nutshell, 
is the thesis of Thomas Kühne’s provocative essay on German society under the 
Nazis.”); see also Benjamin Lieberman, From Definition to Process: The Effects and Roots 
of Genocide, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN GENOCIDE RESEARCH 3, 9 (Adam Hones ed. 2012) 
(“In the early stages of the development of an imagined community such as a na-
tion, genocide is also a method to forge or build that community or nation. Turkey 
provides an important example. The Armenian Genocide and the simultaneous de-
struction of Assyrian Christians within core areas of the shell of the Ottoman Em-
pire sped the formation of a Turkish nation within what would soon become a 
Turkish nation-state.”). 
74 See, e.g., Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 
AM. J. SOC. 421 (1956) (describing moral indignation as fueling the destruction pro-
cess); see also INGA CLENDINNEN, READING THE HOLOCAUST 138–55 (1999) (relating 
stories of Nazi collective violence during WWII); and KÜHNE, supra note 14, at 78 
(“[W]e see the triumphant group of perpetrators [of genocide] enjoying themselves 
committing or watching cruelty.”).  The idea of collective violence being a means of 
building a community should not be that unfamiliar or strange.  In many circum-
stances the nation-state, that central institution of our current world, was born of 
collective violence.   
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actors; they also saw themselves as a community of future victims 
who would be subject to Tutsi revenge if the job were not completed.  
A similar sentiment was expressed during the genocide in WWII.  
Herman Göring, “chief of Luftwaffe and designated successor of 
Hitler,” is quoted as having expressed the following in 1942: “If we 
lose the war, you will be annihilated . . .. The Jew is behind every-
thing, and it is he who has declared a fight to the death, and to ruin 
against us.”  Göring then went on to say that, “The Jew with his Old 
Testament hatred is what we are to expect if the Jew is enabled to 
take revenge on us.”75  The group that united itself as victimizer now 
wants to sustain that unity by turning members into potential vic-
tims.  Both in the Rwanda and Nazi Germany cases, the community 
of purifiers was reinforced by the community of potential victims. 
To summarize, the genocidaire simultaneously destroys a com-
munity and attempts to chase the fanciful idea of his pure commu-
nity.  Genocide is an activity that brings people together as killers 
and as victim (or potential victim) groups.  Community and belong-
ing are the very foundations of genocide.  But the notions of com-
munity and belonging are based on the seemingly contradictory du-
alistic self-view of the perpetrators of genocide: superiority and 
vulnerability.76  If we forget to understand this, we will have under-
mined our chances of responding to genocide and threats of geno-
cide more effectively. 
 
4.  GENOCIDE, LAW AND BELONGING 
 
Quite often, when we think about mass crimes such as genocide, 
we think of the space beyond law.  These crimes are thought to occur 
in a space and at a time when law is not functioning or is not in con-
trol.  On the surface, this way of thinking makes perfect sense.  It is 
often a given that mass murder, often involving groups as victims 
and as perpetrators, is non-law or beyond law.  However, this intu-
itive understanding of the relationship between law and mass 
crimes is misleading.  It masks the disturbing truth that mass crimes 
are often preceded by (and their occurrence prepared for) by all sorts 
of law.  People don’t simply wake up one day and commit genocide.  
                                                      
75 KÜHNE, supra note 14, at 131. 
76 See NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING 
78 (1985) (The “dualistic self-view of superiority and accompanying vulnerability 
bordering on paranoia can be a particularly explosive mix.”). 
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They start setting themselves (or are set) apart from others, seeing 
other groups or communities as evil, as a mortal threat, or as simply 
impure. 
This attitude or disposition is often accomplished through law.  
At times, there is formal law77 that marks or constructs the particular 
group as a distinct category and is subsequently used as the basis on 
which the group is physically eliminated or socially debased.  Thus, 
for example, before Auschwitz there was law.78  There was a legally 
constituted state and a people which defined itself, “legally, almost 
purely in terms of its Other, The Jew.”79  Jews were written into law 
as the dangerous Other.80 
                                                      
77 By “formal law,” I refer to law emanating from the State through the normal 
processes that law is adopted in the particular state.   
78 For a detailed and interesting study of the role of law in the period before 
and after Auschwitz, see generally DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ: TOWARD 
A JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLOCAUST (2005).  The following are some of the laws: 
Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, art. 3 (“Civil servants who 
are not of Aryan descent are to be retired; if they are honorary officials, they are to 
be dismissed from their official status.”); the regulation passed on April 11, 1933 
pursuant to the Civil Service Law made it clear what the phrase “not of Aryan de-
cent” meant when it stated: “A person is to be considered non-Aryan if he is de-
scended from non-Aryan, and especially from Jewish parents or grandparents;” the 
Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor, passed on November 14, 1953, 
declared that “Marriage between Jews and citizens of German or kindred blood are 
forbidden . . . .  Sexual relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of 
German blood or kindred blood are forbidden.”  And the Hereditary Farm Law 
stipulated that “only men of German or related blood can become farmers (Bau-
ern).”  
79 FRASER, supra note 78, at 15; see also MICHAEL BURLEIGH AND WOLFGANG 
WIPPERMANN, THE RACIAL STATE: GERMANY 1933–1945 305–306 (1991) (“The re-
gime’s ‘national community’ was based upon the exclusion and extermination of 
all those deemed to be ‘alien’, ‘hereditary ill’, or ‘asocial’.  These ‘elements’ were 
subject to constant and escalating forms of selection.  The ‘national community’ it-
self was categorized in accordance with racial criteria.”); For a fascinating account 
of how the Nuremberg laws, especially the second and third Nuremberg laws, 
which defined the Jew as a threat to both German blood and honor, developed and 
how American racist laws were Hitler’s model, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S 
AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW (2017).  
(“In the early 1930s, Nazi lawyers were engaged in creating a race law founded on 
anti-miscegenation law and race-based immigration, naturalization, and second-
class citizenship law. They went looking for foreign models, and found them—in 
the United States of America,” Id, at 16); see also Campbell, supra note 34, at 155 
(describing genocide as a form of social control to address grievances against tar-
geted ethnic groups).  
80 FRASER, supra note 78, at 6 (“Nazi law recreated the Jew as a separate and 
distinct legal category in order then to destroy the category itself.”); see also id. at 31 
(“‘The Jew’ is the unwritten and necessary Other of the Volk.”); see also KÜHNE, supra 
note 14, at 164 (“The conclusion is inescapable: the Nazi regime not only propa-
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In Rwanda, too, there was a great deal of law that preceded (and 
prepared the ground for) the genocide.  There was, for, example, a 
requirement that one register and carry identity cards identifying 
him/her as Tutsi or Hutu.81  A Hutu then imagined himself as “what 
a Tutsi was not, and vice versa.”82  Those identity cards “served as 
death tickets for Tutsi during the genocide.”83  In relation to the Bal-
kan conflict, the International Court of Justice found that there were 
circumstances where individuals were forced “to wear signs of 
membership of a group,” the purpose of which was “to stigmatize 
the group’s members.”84  Often, such marking is not just a matter of 
stigmatizing but it also makes it easier to attack or eliminate mem-
bers of the group and it may certainly signify “the intent to destroy 
the group[.]”85  In other circumstances, formal law was employed by 
state authorities to lay the groundwork for the genocidal acts that 
followed.86 
                                                      
gated a racially defined national community, the Volksgemeinschaft, but estab-
lished it as a political, social, and psychological reality, not so much by providing 
Germans with economic benefits or by resolving their class conflicts but by making 
Germans complicit in mass crime.”). 
81 Group classification and ID cards were introduced by the Belgian colonial 
government in 1933.  Gourevitch, supra note 37, at 14 (“[I]n 1933-34, the Belgians 
conducted a census in order to issue identity cards, which labelled every Rwandan 
as either Hutu (eighty-five per cent) or Tutsi (fourteen per cent) or Twa (one per 
cent).  The identity cards made it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsi, 
and allowed the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid system that 
perpetuated the myth of Tutsi superiority.”).  
82 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 50. 
83 Gourevitch, supra note 37, at 22. An ID card with the designation of “Tutsi” 
meant that the person at a roadblock would almost certainly face death.  See Prose-
cutor v. Akayesu, supra note 58, at ¶ 123 (describing the roadblocks); see also Alison 
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Stories, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 147 n.60 (1999) 
(pointing to attempts to remove ethnic categories from identity papers) (citation 
omitted); Jean de la Croix Tabaro, The Passport to Death: Story of Rwanda’s Notorious 
ID, KT PRESS (July 13, 2015), http://ktpress.rw/2015/07/the-passport-to-death-
story-of-rwandas-notorious-id/ [https://perma.cc/5UX3-URGP] (Last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017); Fussell, supra note 62 (“Along with the prior training of militias, stock-
piling of weapons, direction of the massacres by hate radio, the prior existence of 
ethnic ID cards was one of the most important factors facilitating the speed and 
magnitude of the 100 days of mass killings in Rwanda.”  Just above this statement 
Fussell displays the ID card of the woman who lost her life.). 
84 Application of Convention on Genocide, supra note 35 at ¶ 382. 
85 Id. at ¶ 417. 
86 Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and the Armenians in the Ottoman Em-
pire are good examples.  For a general account of the role of law in the perpetration 
of genocide, see generally JENNIFER BALINT, GENOCIDE, STATE CRIME AND THE LAW: IN 
THE NAME OF THE STATE (2012) (focusing on what she considers to be seven instances 
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In terms of law facilitating genocides and ethnic cleansing, ear-
lier societies were no different.87  Thus, in relation to the early history 
of the United States and its dealings with Native Americans, law 
was used as a source of ethnic cleansing.  In his inaugural address 
as president of the United States in 1828, Andrew Jackson called for 
a federal Indian Removal Act through which the region (such as the 
state of Georgia) was to be “cleansed” of Indians.  Congress passed 
the removal bill, which was then signed into law by Jackson.  As 
Kiernan notes, although under the law removal was going to be vol-
untary, “most Indians would leave only under threat and harass-
ment.”88  Perhaps not surprisingly, speaking in 1942 about the Ger-
manization of Poland, Hitler cited United States’ action in relation 
to Native Americans as a parallel: “The struggle we are waging there 
(i.e. Poland) against the Partisans resembles very much the struggle 
in North America against the Red Indians.  Victory will go to the 
strong.”89 
At other times, the law might not be formal or state-generated 
(an expression of the will of the sovereign90), but instead what Mi-
chael Reisman refers to as “microlaw.”91  The idea that lawmaking 
                                                      
of genocide, Balint shows how law is a companion/a facilitator of genocidal com-
munity building). 
87 See generally KIERNAN, supra note 23 (providing a global history of genocide 
and extermination from ancient times).  
88 Id. at 332.  
89 Hitler, August 8, 1942, in HITLER’S TABLE TALK, 1941-42: HIS PRIVATE 
CONVERSATIONS supra note 60 at 284. See also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN 
MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 47 (2017) who 
quotes Hitler as having expressed his admiration of America for the westward ex-
pansion of the “Nordic” stock and the slaughter of Native Americans.  America, 
Hitler notes, had “gunned down the millions of Redskins to a few hundred thou-
sand” which he thought Europeans would do well to emulate. 
90 Here “both the ultimate origin of law and the ultimate sanction of law” are 
seen to inhere in “the will of the state.” HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE NATURE AND 
FUNCTION OF LAW 21 (1958); see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 56 (2015) (exploring 
what he calls the “universal history” of legal thought (which he critiques), Unger 
identifies three elements in that universal history one of which is “the view of law 
as the will of the state or of the sovereign.”).  
91 MICHAEL RESIMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 2 (1999) (“The law of the state 
may be important, but law, real law, is found in all human relations, from the sim-
plest, briefest encounter between two people to the most inclusive and permanent 
type of interaction.  Law is a property of interaction.  Real law is generated, rein-
forced, changed, and terminated continually in the course of almost all of human 
activity.  This law, which I refer to as “microlaw,” also manifests a constitutional 
dimension or, to put it more dynamically, a constitutive process: part of every de-
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is not exhausted by the action of state-centric institutions or pro-
cesses was powerfully made by Robert Cover in a series of articles.92  
For Cover, the state-centric vision of law is incomplete and the legal 
processes and legal actors encompass a normative universe held to-
gether by the force of interpretive commitments of communities, 
some of whom are small and private while others are large and pub-
lic.93  According to Cover, lawmaking therefore occurs in various 
communities with different sizes and organizational characters.94  I 
                                                      
cision is concerned, not with the immediate decision, but with the structure of de-
cision-making itself.”).  The idea of labeling “microlaw” (essentially custom, usage 
and ordered social relations) as “real law” is of course controversial.  Critics argue 
that this is too inclusive a view of law which threatens to make law become every-
thing and hence nothing. Positivists, who essentially limit the label to rules and 
regulations that have their origin with the state, and natural law theorists who re-
serve the label for attempts to explicate law out of rightness or right reasons, clearly 
do not consider custom or usage to be law on their own rights.  I do not wish to 
enter that debate here.  For my purposes, it is sufficient that some customs and us-
ages have the functional equivalent of law and there is in fact a well-respected 
school of jurisprudence—historical-sociological jurisprudence—that embraces “mi-
crolaw.”  See EUGENE EHRLICH, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
LAW 497 (1975) (“The living law is not the part of the content of the document that 
the courts recognize as binding . . . but only that part which the parties actually 
observe in life.”  Ehrlich goes on to make the following observation at another point 
in the book: “It is not an essential element of the concept of law that it be created by 
the State nor that it constitute the basis for the decision of courts or other tribunals, 
nor that it be the basis of a legal compulsion consequent upon such a decision.  A 
fourth element remains, and that will have to be the point of departure, i.e. the law 
is an ordering.”).  Id. at 24.  For the criticism that this highly inclusive notion of law 
threatens to undermine the very idea of law, see FELIX COHEN, THE LEGAL 
CONSCIENCE 187 (1960) (arguing that Ehrlich is confused with respect to definitions 
dealing with notion of law); see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012) (providing an interest-
ing account of the various circumstances within which law emerges and the multi-
ple venues out of which it springs); see also LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 125 (1971) (“Society, be it a tribe or a ‘modern’ nation, 
is not an undifferentiated amalgam of people.  It is rather a patterned mosaic of 
subgroups that belong to certain, usually well-defined (or definable) types with dif-
ferent memberships, composition, and degree of inclusiveness.  Every such sub-
group owes its existence in a large degree to a legal system that is its own and that 
regulates the behavior of its members.”). 
92 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1601 (1986); Robert Cover, The Use of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, 
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish 
Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. & RELIG. 65 (1987) (stating that “Judaism is, 
itself, a legal culture of great antiquity . . . .  [I]t can lay as much claim as any of the 
other great legal cultures to have an integrity to its basic categories.”). 
93 See generally Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 92. 
94 See Cover, The Use of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 92, at 682 (describ-
ing how systems inevitably includes tensions and conflicts of social order); see also 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
   
1070 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
shall refer to law outside the state as “regulatory cultural norm.”95  
Whether one refers to it as microlaw, non-state law, informal law, or 
regulatory cultural norm, law here is a property of tradition and cul-
ture and, as in formal law, it structures the decision-making process 
within the particular community while simultaneously imagining 
the community itself.  In relation to informal law’s role in genocide, 
Neha Jain was surely right when she observed that the “perpetrator 
of an international crime (in our case, genocide) acts within a moral 
and cultural universe where his actions correspond to the values of 
the group to which he belongs.”96  The normative universe within 
which the genocidaire acts both imagines the “pure” community, 
which the genocidaire seeks to establish, and also lays the ground-
work for establishing it.  That is not to say that there are no dissen-
sions within the culture, both about the unfavorable perception of 
the targeted groups and of the idea of a pure community itself.  Ra-
ther, it is simply to suggest that the genocidaire acts within a wide-
spread cultural belief or normative universe that views the targeted 
group as the evil Other who must be removed from the community. 
Hence, in Rwanda, even without the formal identity cards, peo-
ple had developed customs or micro-law through which they 
marked each other as an indication of what they were not and would 
not want to be.  Quite often those norms created a distinct group, 
where the existence of such a group prior to the law had been am-
biguous.  In relation to Rwanda, for example, the evidence shows 
                                                      
Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 92, at 43 (pointing out how communities often 
generate norms in different ways with competing “rules of recognition”). 
95 I must emphasize here what I noted earlier: there is intense debate within 
the legal community and between legal scholars and scholars in other fields (such 
as sociologists and anthropologists) as to whether there is such a thing as non-state 
law.  For many legal scholars, law is a property of the state and the regulatory 
norms invoked and enforced by non-state actors do not deserve to have the label of 
“law” attached to them.  For legal pluralists (whether legal scholars or scholars in 
other fields), law as a regulatory norm is present in various arenas (cultural and 
religious groups, indigenous peoples, non-state actors of other kinds, etc.), and to 
insist on state-centrism as the condition of legality is to exclude a whole lot of reg-
ulatory process in human affairs which is functionally no different from formal 
state generated law.  See generally Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Pri-
vate Ordering, and Indigenous Law 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981) (showing how the 
legal centrist model is deficient and how abandoning it can improve access to jus-
tice). 
96 Neha Jain, Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search of a Concept of 
Perpetration, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. REV. 831, 836 (2013); see also Gourevitch, supra note 
37, at 6 (“During the genocide, the work of the killers was not regarded as a crime 
in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every citizen was responsible 
for its administration.”). 
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that in the pre-colonial period, “Hutus and Tutsis spoke the same 
language, intermarried, followed the same religion, and shared the 
same social and political structure of small chiefdoms. Some live in-
termingled, without territorial distinction on the same hills, sharing 
the same social and political culture in small chiefdoms. . . Hutus 
could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become hereditary 
Hutus.”97  In the post-colonial period, however, through formal and 
informal law, distinct communities were imagined.  What was le-
gally and culturally produced was then viewed as primordial.98  In-
deed, one of the functions of law (whether formal or informal) is to 
normalize what would otherwise have looked strange or abnormal. 
 
5.  INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO GENOCIDE:  IMAGINING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
As I have argued above, as perverse as it sounds, genocide is in 
fact an exercise in community building.  In a world of dislocation 
and anxiety, genocide and other mass atrocities may in the future 
occur more frequently than we imagine.99  Available evidence indi-
cates that law, both in its formal and informal dimensions, is often 
                                                      
97 Gourevitch, supra note 37, at 13. 
98 This is the idea that genocide occurs as a result of an age-old animosity be-
tween the relevant ethnic groups who are very different from one another.  Arjun 
Appadurai has labelled this as the “primordialist” positon.  See generally ARJUN 
APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION (Dilip 
Gaonkar & Benjamin Lee ed., 1996). 
99 There are many countries that are or ought to be on genocide watch.  The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations mentioned Syria and the Central African 
Republic as prime examples of a distinct possibility of genocide.  See Ban Ki-moon, 
supra note 42.  There are many other countries which ought to be on genocide 
watch..  The idea of genocide watch is to ensure that relevant international or re-
gional institutions can intervene early enough (and before the need of the use of 
force) to minimize the risk of a full-blown genocide.  The president of Genocide 
Watch makes the point: “The U.N. Security Council and key governments need 
strong, independent Early Warning systems to predict where and when ethnic con-
flict and genocide are going to occur, and to present policy options on prevention 
and intervention.” George H. Stanton, How We Can Prevent Genocide: Building an 
International Campaign to End Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH (2003), available at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/howpreventgenocideic.html 
[https://perma.cc/7ZPU-5MMH] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).  Stanton lists eight 
stages of genocide which he believes are predictable (and presumably therefore 
avoidable):  classification (categorizing along certain characteristics), symbolization 
(imbuing those categories with symbols), dehumanization (referring to particular 
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highly implicated in the creation of categories, and then in the elim-
ination of the categories themselves.  What I shall argue in this sec-
tion is that if mass atrocities such as genocide are exercises in com-
munity building, then the international response to those atrocities 
(either to forestall or punish) is also a way (perhaps a test) to imagine 
the contours of the international community, a community of mul-
tiplicity in contrast and counter to the genocidaire’s fantasy of a 
“pure” community.  While genocide is about the denial of the very 
existence of one or another community, international response to it 
may be the imagining of another larger and inclusive community.  
On this account, international legal doctrines adopted to deal with 
genocide are not simply instrumental, but constitutive as well. 
As I indicated earlier, I shall explore this thesis using two inter-
national legal doctrines: universal jurisdiction and the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (R2P), and show how these doctrines have been or can 
be used to respond to prevent or punish genocide.  In the next few 
pages I shall briefly outline the nature of these two doctrines before 
I go on to explore the thesis that these doctrines are partly about a 
process through which the international community imagines itself. 
As a general comment, jurisdictional norms, perhaps more than 
other norms, play an important role in defining communities and 
belonging.  Jurisdictions define what a nation, a state, a city, or a 
religious community is.  To prescribe jurisdictional rules is to assert 
or to assume that a particular territorial community is a community 
of interest.  Traditional international prescriptive and adjudicative 
jurisdictions define the authority of every state vis-à-vis other states.  
As I show in the next page, universal jurisdiction (and, to some ex-
tent, R2P) is a process through which we imagine the international 
community as a community of interest, a diverse albeit vulnerable 
community. 
 
5.1.  Universal Jurisdiction 
 
Traditional international law requires that there be some connec-
tion between the jurisdiction-asserting state and the crime the state 
wishes to prohibit or punish.  The connection might be based on the 
nationality of the victim or perpetrator, or on the fact that the crime 
                                                      
group with animal images), organization (“genocide is always organized”), polari-
zation (“extremists drive the groups apart”), identification (“victims are identified 
and separated out” on the basis of the classification), extermination, and denial.  Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
  
2017] Genocide and Belonging 1073 
is committed on the territory of the state, or because the crime has 
an impact on the security interest of the state, etc.100  Thus, prescrip-
tive and adjudicative norms require that there be some connection 
between the jurisdiction-asserting state and the event which the 
state wishes to regulate.  These norms are thought to be justified by 
the existence of what Ronald Dworkin, in another context, has re-
ferred to as “associative or communal obligations.”101  For a legiti-
mate adjudicative or prescriptive jurisdiction to be asserted, the reg-
ulated person or act must be connected, however thickly or thinly, 
to the territorial and political community we call the state. Jurisdic-
tion here is, therefore, premised on some notion of membership to a 
political community. Universal jurisdiction, however, does not stem 
from such connection. 
Universal jurisdiction is the international legal principle under 
which any state is permitted102 to assert prescriptive and adjudica-
tive jurisdiction over individuals who are alleged to have committed 
certain international crimes (genocide and crimes against humanity 
being two of them).  Jurisdiction is permitted whether or not those 
crimes were committed within the territory of the state, and regard-
less of the nationality or residence of the victim or victimizer.103  That 
is, a state can prosecute and punish anyone who has committed cer-
                                                      
100 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, at § 402 (listing the instances in 
which the state has jurisdiction to prescribe law); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, 
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL Law 456-466 (8th ed., 2012) 
(providing an overview of the general bases of jurisdiction and the principles be-
hind them). 
101 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 196 (1986).  More recently, in an article he 
finished just before he passed away and published posthumously, Dworkin made 
the same point about international law.  See Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for 
International Law, 41 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 2, 11 (2013) (“We must locate the source of po-
litical obligation elsewhere [rather than “consent”]: in my view, we must locate it 
in the more general phenomenon of associative obligation.”). 
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, at § 404 cmt. A (commenting on the 
expansion of the state’s ability to assert jurisdiction); see also MITSUE INAZUMI, 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 132-48 
(2005) (examining the status of universal jurisdiction in customary international 
law). 
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, at § 404 (explaining state jurisdic-
tion as it relates to activities within and outside state territory); see also CRAWFORD, 
supra note 100, at 467–71 (expanding on the reach of state jurisdiction under inter-
national law). 
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tain international crimes, such as genocide, regardless of any con-
nection between the crime and the prosecuting state.104  Universal 
jurisdiction is a form of cosmopolitan intervention to render correc-
tive justice when the state with the primary responsibility to prose-
cute and punish is unable or unwilling to do so. Universal jurisdic-
tion signifies the idea of shared responsibility in terms of punishing 
those who have committed mass or grave crimes such as genocide.  
Several countries have invoked universal jurisdiction to try Rwan-
dans for atrocities committed during the Rwanda genocide.105 
 
5.2.  Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
 
R2P is the front end of the spectrum of shared responsibility.  
The doctrine was formally introduced on the international level at 
the U.N. World Summit in 2005, where the heads of states and gov-
ernments of 170 states, after affirming the primary responsibility of 
governments to protect their citizens from crimes such as geno-
cide,106 endorsed the idea of the international community shoulder-
ing a secondary responsibility if and when those with the primary 
                                                      
104 An example of a universal jurisdiction law is found in the German Code of 
Crimes Against International Law. Section 1 of the Code provides: “This Act shall 
apply to all criminal offences against international law designed under this Act, to 
serious criminal offences designated therein even when the offences was commit-
ted abroad and bears no relation to Germany.”  See GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 406 (2005). 
105 Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands (among others) have indicted and 
prosecuted genocidaires.  Belgium, for example, prosecuted two nuns in connection 
with the Rwanda genocide.  
106 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 15, 2005), ¶ 138, avail-
able at http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2A5T-LSAH] (“Each individual State has the responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”).  
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responsibility are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibil-
ities.107  The doctrine was incorporated in qualified form into Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1674.108  To ensure that the veto power is not 
employed to prevent intervention to avert or to stop atrocities, the 
International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS)109 and other groups have suggested that there be a “code of 
conduct” for the Permanent Five as to when not to use their veto 
powers (“constructive abstention”).110  Perhaps that is what we saw 
with SC Resolution 1973 in relation to Libya.111  China and Russia 
abstained, which allowed for the adoption of the resolution author-
izing intervention.112 
Although the international agreement on R2P does not explicitly 
entertain ideas of unilateral or collective responsibility outside the 
                                                      
107 Id. at ¶ 139 (“The international community, through the United Nations, 
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, in-
cluding Chapter VII[.]”). 
108 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 26 (Apr. 28, 2006) (“The Security Council . . . [n]otes that 
the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the commis-
sion of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitar-
ian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and, reaffirms in this regard its readiness to consider 
such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.”) (emphasis in 
original).  
109 ICISS was composed of independent experts and the group was convened 
by the Canadian government to explore ways in which the international commu-
nity could respond to gross and systematic violations of human rights.  It is ICISS 
that produced the report that proposed the idea of R2P.  See generally THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytopro-
tect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3J5-NP6E]. 
110 The Permanent Five refers to the five major powers (China, France, Russia, 
United Kingdom, and United States), who are permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council each possessing a veto power over substantive matters 
that come before the Council and with which they disagree. 
111 See S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (reviewing the resolutions eventually 
adopted by the Security Council).  The vote was 10-0-5. China, Russia, Brazil, Ger-
many and India abstained.  
112 But the perception (not an unreasonable one) that NATO used the authori-
zation under Resolution 1973 to engage in unauthorized regime change rather than 
protecting vulnerable people (especially in Benghazi) from the threat of the Libyan 
government, made it tougher to get Russia and China to go along with a Security 
Council authorized military response to the Syrian crisis or referring the Syrian sit-
uation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
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Security Council or the U.N. Process, given the seriousness of crimes 
such as genocide, it would be utterly inconceivable or unimaginable 
that states or regional groupings are prevented to act either individ-
ually or collectively if the Security Council fails to act when there is 
an imminent threat of the kind that occurred in Rwanda.113  The Se-
curity Council is the first port of call on any matter of military inter-
vention for protection purposes,114 but there are other organizations, 
such as the General Assembly115 or regional and sub-regional organ-
izations, that could act as ports of call as well.  After all, as early as 
                                                      
113 Indeed, military intervention from individual or groups of states for the 
protection of victims from genocide and other mass atrocities is not without prece-
dence.  Thus, “England, France, and Russia intervened in Greece in 1827 to stop 
massacres by Turkey, and France intervened again in Syria in 1860, to stop the kill-
ings of Maronite Christians. Various European powers also intervened in defence 
of Christians in Crete (1866-68), the Balkans (1875-78), and Macedonia (1903-08). . . 
. India sent troops into Bangladesh in 1971 to protect Bengalis for the murderous 
rampage of a military dictatorship in West Pakistan.”  Ramesh Thakur, The Use of 
International Force to Prevent or Halt Atrocities: From Humanitarian Intervention to the 
Responsibility to Protect, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 815, 819 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).  And NATO intervened in Kosovo.  
See LARRY MAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 228 (2010) (“It would be a failure 
of monumental proportions if the international community felt that it was power-
less to go to the aid of an oppressed people that was facing annihilation at the hands 
of a tyrannical government of the sort that Nazi Germany epitomized.”). 
114 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in 2001 made this point clearly and directly when it said: “We have made 
abundantly clear our view that the Security Council should be the first port of call 
on any matter relating to military intervention for human protection purposes.  But 
the question remains whether it should be the last. In view of the Council’s past 
inability or unwillingness to fulfill the role expected of it, if the Security Council 
expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where humanitarian or human rights 
issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to deal with such a proposal 
within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means of discharg-
ing the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted.”  See ICISS, supra note 
109, at 53. 
115 The reluctance to allow military intervention without Security Council au-
thorization is based textually on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which affirms “the 
territorial integrity and political independence” of member states and prohibits 
members not to engage in “the threat or use of force” to undermine the integrity 
and independence of fellow member states.  But it also based on a sensible policy 
that is intended to minimize the occasions of states using human rights as an excuse 
to intervene for other, impermissible, motives.  That legitimate worry could be ad-
dressed without a blanket prohibition of intervention unless authorized by the Se-
curity Council, for permanent members of the Security Council could veto author-
ization for similarly impermissible purposes.  You cannot redeem impermissible 
motives of the intervener by endorsing the impermissible motive of the preventer 
of collective action. So, perhaps one way to deal with the legitimate worry is, for 
example, in the event that there is a veto of a resolution to intervene by a permanent 
member of the Security Council which has garnered the required supermajority 
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1948 the international community adopted the position—through 
the Genocide Convention—that genocide is not simply a crime 
within a particular community, but “a crime under international 
law,” and a crime which member states pledged “to prevent and to 
punish.”116 
It is important to note, as I shall emphasize throughout this arti-
cle, that R2P is not just about military intervention.117  Perhaps it 
ought not to be primarily about military intervention if it is to per-
form its preventive function, which is said to be “the single most 
important dimension”118 of the doctrine’s purpose.  If the interna-
tional community has waited until there is a need for military inter-
vention, then in many cases it has probably waited too long.  After 
all, it is only when “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. 
Charter”119 have failed to avert the threat of genocide that military 
intervention as an option is on the table.  R2P is distinguished from 
the general and traditional notions of humanitarian intervention by 
the idea that prevention is central to the whole enterprise, as well as 
the fact that peaceful means are to be tried to achieve the preventive 
purpose before military intervention is authorized.120 
 
                                                      
vote (nine votes), then the issue would go to the General Assembly for a vote for or 
against authorization (which incidentally would also declare whether there is a 
genocide threat or attack).  Reading the Charter in the best light (consistent with the 
best aspirations of the preamble) would suggest that this action of the Assembly 
will not be ultra vires.  For a similar statement, see Dworkin, A New Philosophy, supra 
note 101, at 25–26. 
116  Convention on Genocide, supra note 22, art. 1.22 
117 In fact, member states in the World Summit Outcome Document expressed 
this sentiment directly and clearly. Member states acknowledged the international 
community had responsibility to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”  See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra 
note 106, at ¶ 139.  But military intervention “does seem to succeed at stopping the 
killing once it has begun[.]”  Krain, supra note 15, at 574; see also Matthew Krain, 
International Intervention and the Severity of Genocide and Politicides, 49 INT’L. STUD. Q. 
363 (2005) (studying the effectiveness of military intervention in genocide and polit-
icide). 
118 ICISS, supra note 109, at XI. 
119 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 106, at ¶ 138. 
120 See Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, 24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 703, 708 (2006) (discussing the new ways of characterizing 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
   
1078 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
5.3.  Universal Jurisdiction and R2P:  Comparison and Summary 
 
Universal jurisdiction, as I use it in this article, is a customary 
international legal principle, while R2P is a doctrine that has been 
announced by the international community with uncertain legal 
pedigree.  But to the extent that the doctrine arose out of a meeting 
of heads of states and governments, and has been endorsed in some 
form by the Security Council in a resolution and in action, R2P is not 
without legitimate source.121 
While universal jurisdiction permits states to act unilaterally and 
in their individual capacity, R2P places the responsibility on the in-
ternational community as a corporate body. States are to work 
through the United Nations when the intervention is peaceful, but 
if peaceful means are inadequate, states are to act through the Secu-
rity Council consistent with the Council’s Chapter VII authority and 
in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 
Universal jurisdiction authorizes states to punish after the fact 
those who have committed atrocities (corrective and remedial), 
while R2P is primarily about preventing the occurrence of or stop-
ping atrocities.  In relation to genocide, the two doctrines are the in-
ternational analogues of what the Genocide Convention requires of 
every state: that it “undertake to prevent and to punish.”122 
The crimes for which R2P is deployed123 are essentially the same 
crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction.  Ethnic cleansing is 
the only crime that R2P protects that is not part of the jus cogens 
norms for which universal jurisdiction can be asserted.  But ethnic 
cleansing could be seen as functionally equivalent to genocide if the 
removal of a group is intended to bring about its demise by scatter-
ing members.124  At any rate, for our purpose it does not matter 
                                                      
121 Alex Bellamy shows that nine of the ten recent crises on which the Security 
Council has acted “referred explicitly to [R2P] and made provision for the protec-
tion of populations.”  Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten, 29 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 161, 166 (2015). 
122 Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at art. 1. 
123 Those crimes are genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and eth-
nic cleansing. 
124 See Application of Genocide Convention (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Mon-
tenegro), supra note 41, at 84. (observing that neither the intent nor the operation to 
make an area ethnically homogenous “can as such be designated as genocide[,]” and 
adding that “[t]his is not to say that acts described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ may never 
constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, ‘delib-
erately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
cal destruction in whole or in part’ . . . .”); see also Application of Convention on 
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whether the list of crimes covered by one doctrine is identical to the 
list in the other, for the crime which is the focus of our inquiry (gen-
ocide) is listed prominently in both. 
Furthermore, both universal jurisdiction and R2P recognize and 
affirm the importance of national communities (states) to belonging 
and protection.  We turn to those communities as an initial matter to 
take primary responsibility (and right of action) for the protection of 
the rights of members of those communities.  The reason we look to 
those communities first is not just because that is where the best and 
most effective form of protection and promotion can take place, but 
also because we make a normative judgment that states (national 
communities) are “sites of collective freedom”125 providing “frame-
work of participation.”126 
At the same time, however, these doctrines imagine another 
community—the international community—to which individuals 
belong and from which they expect protection and corrective action 
in the event that the national community is unable or unwilling to 
provide such protection or corrective action.  In this sense, the two 
international doctrines affirm national communities while also ges-
turing towards cosmopolitanism.127  The state is seen as a site of pri-
mary “membership, allegiance, obligation, and political mobiliza-
tion” on a globe that presents other viable possibilities, including the 
international community itself.128  Understood in this way, it makes 
a great deal of sense why both doctrines limit the domains of their 
operation to a very limited number of crimes that are regarded as 
                                                      
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), supra note 35, 
at  ¶ 376 (clarifying that forced displacement does not necessarily constitute geno-
cide within the meaning of the Convention).  But see, SCHABAS, supra note 20 at 221–
234. In relation to Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention, which lists the forcible 
transfer of the children of one group, the ICJ recently observed that such an act “can 
also entail the intent to destroy the group physically . . . since its can have conse-
quences for the group’s capacity to renew itself, and hence to ensure its long-term 
survival.”  Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), supra note 35, at ¶ 136. 
125 CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 24; see also id. at 201. 
126 See Ruth Gavison, Taking States Seriously, in READING WALZER 44 (Yitzhak 
Benbaji & Naomi Sussmann eds., 2014). 
127 This gesture towards nationalism and cosmopolitanism as a general matter 
is defended in DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2007). 
128 CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 215 (“Perhaps today the state must be thought 
and lived as one site of membership, allegiance, obligation, and political mobiliza-
tion on a globe that presents other viable possibilities of identification, inside and 
outside state boundaries.”). 
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crimes against all of us.  The most apt example is the crime of geno-
cide, a crime whose perpetrators are regarded as hostis humani gene-
ris (enemies of humankind).  I shall explain later what the notions of 
“crimes against all humankind” and the idea of hostis humani generis 
entail. 
  
5.4.  What Makes Genocide an Offense Eligible for R2P and Universal 
Jurisdiction:  Current Accounts 
 
Before I develop the constitutive thesis of the international re-
sponse to genocide, let me briefly canvas the available explanations 
for why international response to genocide or threatened genocide 
is justified. 
 
5.4.1.  Genocide “Shocks the Conscience” 
 
Many scholars and international tribunals have asserted that 
what makes genocide and a few other international crimes candi-
dates for intervention either at the front or the back end is the hei-
nousness or shocking nature of the crime.  Referring to jus cogens 
norms, which include genocide and are subject to universal jurisdic-
tion, Professor M. Cherif Bassouni claims that the only way to un-
derstand their existence is to realize that “certain crimes affect the 
interests of the world community as a whole because they threaten 
the peace and security of humankind and they shock the conscience of 
humanity.”129  The sentiment that it is the shocking or “heinous” na-
                                                      
129 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Om-
nes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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ture of the crime that makes genocide subject to universal jurisdic-
tion is repeated by many other scholars130 and international tribu-
nals.131  The same sentiment is expressed in relation to international 
military intervention to prevent genocide.  Thus, the noted political 
theorist Michael Walzer in his deservedly famous book, Just and Un-
just Wars, argues that humanitarian intervention (such as R2P) is jus-
tified in response to acts that “shock the conscience of mankind,”132 
and he puts genocide at the end of the “nastiness” spectrum.133  
More recently, the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) expressed a similar view concluding that 
genocide and other international crimes are “conscience shocking” 
and hence grounds for international intervention at the front end.134  
Even more recently, a former United Nations Assistant Secretary-
                                                      
130 See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1, 4 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (describing the shocking nature of crimes as 
contributing to their inclusion in global jurisdiction); Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining 
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 244 (2001) (“Application of the the-
ory of universal jurisdiction . . . is predicated on largely on the notion that some 
crimes are so heinous that they offend the interest of all humanity—indeed, they 
imperil civilization itself.”); Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerg-
ing Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2006) (“In 
modern times, universal jurisdiction has been founded on the sheer heinousness of 
certain crimes, such as genocide and torture, which are universally condemned and 
which every state has an interest in repressing even in the absence of traditional 
connecting factors.”). 
131 Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 31, at 23 (stating that Genocide is “a denial of the right of ex-
istence of the entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of man-
kind[.]”).  This statement has been quoted in subsequent ICJ decisions.  See, e.g., 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 31 (July 8, 1996); Application of the Convention on Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), supra note 
41, at ¶ 161. 
132 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 107 (4th ed. 2006).  See also Michael Walzer, The Moral 
Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1980) (respond-
ing to criticisms of his book, Just and Unjust Wars).  This sentiment has powerful 
pedigree: John Stuart Mill is said to have expressed the view that intervention is 
justified when “a state renders itself guilty of cruelties and persecution of its na-
tionals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the 
conscience of mankind.”  See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 
(8th ed. 1955) (giving a brief account of the position of Mill), see also John Stuart Mill, 
A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS: POLITICAL, 
PHILOSOPHICAL, AND HISTORICAL Vol. 3 153, 171–72 (1867).  
133 See Michael Walzer, THINKING POLITICALLY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 238 
(David Miller ed., 2007).  
134 ICISS, supra note 109, at 33. 
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General and one of the principal authors of The Responsibility to Pro-
tect expressed a similar sentiment.  Ramesh Thakur, who is currently 
serving as a professor of international relations at the Australian Na-
tional University, observes that: “R2P is the normative instrument 
of choice to convert a shocked international conscience into effective 
collective action.”135 
The observation that genocide is heinous or that it shocks the 
conscience seems unremarkably obvious.  The idea of eliminating 
an entire group from the face of the earth to chase the horrible fan-
tasy of creating a pure community ought to shock people.  But as an 
explanation why it is one of only a handful of international crimes 
that should be subject to universal jurisdiction or to R2P interven-
tion, it does not seem to be entirely persuasive.  First, as I have ex-
plained in another article, the claim is under-inclusive.136  There are 
many crimes, such as forced disappearances, wide extra-judicial 
killings, and terrorist acts (e.g. beheadings), which are heinous and 
ought to shock our conscience, yet are not part of the list.137 
Second, and more importantly, those who rely on “heinousness” 
and “shock of the mind” to justify the list of crimes eligible for uni-
versal jurisdiction and R2P intervention do not supply any princi-
pled way by which, as a normative matter, we decide which crimes 
are properly characterized as such.  Without more guidance, it 
would be impossible to justify the existing list or to advocate addi-
tion to or subtraction from it.  That is, a coherent account justifying 
the limited current list both in relation to universal jurisdiction and 
R2P will also enable us to determine whether or not the list should 
be lengthened or shortened. 
But perhaps the reason why genocide shocks the mind is be-
cause it is thought of as a crime that causes large-scale harm.138  Un-
der this understanding, it is the scale of the destruction rather than 
                                                      
135 Thakur, supra note 113, at 817; see also Ramesh Thakur, R2P’s ‘Structural’ 
Problems: A Response to Roland Paris, 22 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 11, 23 (2015). 
136 See Adeno Addis, Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Di-
mension of Universal Jurisdiction, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 129, 139 (2009) (“It is also under-
inclusive to the extent that many crimes that devalue and even destroy human life 
itself are not part of the list of crimes that are heinous and diminish all of us.”). 
137 Id. at 139. 
138 See BEATRICE I. BONAFÉ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 71 (2009) (stating that “International 
crimes are offences which require to be carried out on such a large scale that the 
participations or at least the support of the state apparatus has often been pre-
sent.”).  
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the nature of the crime that makes it shocking.  On reflection, how-
ever, this argument is not entirely persuasive.  For there to be a crime 
of genocide the law does not require that large-scale atrocities be 
committed.  Indeed, technically there could be a genocidal crime 
even with a relatively small number of direct victims—deaths, inju-
ries, etc.—as long as the requisite intent to destroy the particular 
group in whole or in part is present.  International tribunals seem to 
agree with this observation.  Thus, for example, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held that genocide 
could occur even in circumstances of small-scale killings by a single 
individual who engages in those activities with the intent of destroy-
ing the group, even when that intent is entirely unrealistic.139  Thus, 
to the extent that genocide shocks the mind, it must be because of 
the nature of the crime rather than the number of its victims.140 
Even if one were to agree on a list, one would still need to show 
why and how these crimes affect “the interest of all humanity,”141 
for often the heinousness of the crime is linked to its effect on the 
interests of the international community—the “great losses to hu-
manity” that are “inflicted”142 by it.  That is, these heinous crimes 
invite intervention because they affect the interests of the interna-
tional community as a whole.143  The question remains as to what 
precisely is the interest of the international community that is 
uniquely implicated by the occurrence of genocide in one remote 
part of the world?  Those who advance “shock” and “heinousness” 
as grounds for justifying the current list either for the assertion of 
universal jurisdiction or intervention under R2P have not effectively 
responded to this question. 
                                                      
139 Prosecutor v. Jelisi, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1999) (explaining that the mens rea distinguishes 
genocide).  I must point out here, however, that a prominent legal scholar on geno-
cide, William Schabas, believes that we should infer large scale from the definition 
of genocide.  See SCHABAS, supra note 20.   
140 See Margaret M. De Guzman, When are International Crimes Just Cause for 
War, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 73, 92 (2014) (Presenting that the just cause threshold for hu-
manitarian intervention is qualitative, based on the nature of the time, not quanti-
tative, based on the number of victims).  
141 Sadat, supra note 130, at 244. 
142 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 22, at Preamble. 
143 The Rome Statute of the ICC deems the crimes listed in the statute as “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” and 
ones that “shock the conscience of humanity.”  Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, supra note 26, at pmbl. 
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5.4.2.  Genocide and Chaos 
 
Another explanation that may justify the use of universal juris-
diction and R2P intervention in relation to crimes such as genocide 
is that such crimes often occur in circumstances of political, social 
and legal chaos and without international intervention further chaos 
will ensue and perpetrators will go unpunished.  Under circum-
stances of genocide, legal and political systems and infrastructures 
are under tremendous stress and invariably unable to protect vic-
tims or to punish perpetrators.  Even more likely, the argument 
would go, is the fact that the government that has the primary re-
sponsibility to protect and to correct will itself have been implicated 
in the genocidal outbreak.  It will be utterly naïve, the argument con-
tinues, to expect that the government will discharge its primary re-
sponsibility to respect, protect, or correct under those circumstances.  
The action of the Rwandan government during the genocide and the 
Sudanese government’s attitude to the events in Darfur (the first 
acknowledged genocide of the 21st century) are perhaps good exam-
ples of such circumstance.144 
                                                      
144 The estimate is that anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000 people have 
been killed in the Darfur region.  See Samuel Totten, Genocide in Darfur, in CENTURIES 
OF GENOCIDE, at 513.  Totten places the figure between 300,000 and 400,000, but oth-
ers vary between 200,000 and 500,000. Even though there are disputes about the 
numbers, there is increasing consensus that genocide was committed in Darfur.  In 
2004, the United States Congress passed a resolution declaring the situation in Dar-
fur a genocide; and there is a warrant out for the President of Sudan, Omar al-
Bashir, on genocide charges from the ICC.  The arrest warrant was issued on March 
4, 2009 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur 
issue to the Court.  Since Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the only way 
that the Court could assert jurisdiction on President al-Bashir was if the Security 
Council (pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome Statute) referred the matter to it 
(which is what happened here).  But even that move does not seem to have led us 
any closer to the apprehension of al-Bashir. Indeed, a recent event shows how ut-
terly powerless the ICC is in terms of getting those it has indicted before the Court, 
especially if those individuals have powerful friends to protect them.  In June 2015, 
al-Bashir flew to South Africa to attend a meeting of the African Union.  A South 
African organization sought an order from a court in South Africa to get him ar-
rested and delivered to the ICC pursuant to the warrant.  Since South Africa is sig-
natory to the Rome Statute, the applicants for the arrest argued, it is required to 
apprehend and delivered al-Bashir to the ICC.  The South Africa High Court in-
structed the nation’s authorities to prevent al-Bashir from leaving South Africa until 
the Court has made a determination whether or not he should be arrested pursuant 
to the ICC warrant.  However, al-Bashir was allowed to fly back to Sudan, in viola-
tion of South Africa’s treaty commitment, and according to the High Court of South 
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On reflection, however, it is not quite clear that this would be a 
sufficient ground for distinguishing the listed crimes from other 
crimes.  There are many other crimes, such as extra-judicial killings 
and torture, which are often committed by governments or their 
supporters against those considered to be internal enemies or chal-
lenges to the established order and are left as unpunished as those 
on the list of crimes said to be subject to universal jurisdiction and 
to intervention under R2P.  And although most of the crimes on the 
R2P list are committed in the course of an armed conflict (often a 
civil war), a time where legal infrastructures are in serious stress, as 
I indicated earlier there are other crimes (such as mass torture), 
which tend to occur under such circumstances as well.  In any case, 
in relation to the crime with which we are concerned here (geno-
cide), an armed conflict is not necessary145 and there are numerous 
examples that illustrate this (unless of course one sees the genocide 
itself as an armed conflict, but that would be unhelpfully circular). 
Even if it were the case that genocide is one of the few crimes 
that is likely to go unpunished if there is no international interven-
tion, there is still the question as to why such intervention is consid-
ered to be in the interests of the international community or what 
interest of the international community is so affected that interna-
tional intervention is required. 
Now, some, including M. Cherif Bassouni, have argued that in-
ternational intervention in relation to jus cogen norms (which in-
cludes genocide) may be partly explained by the chaos that would 
ensue not only in relation to the particular country, but in relation 
to the rest of the world as well, especially neighboring countries.  
                                                      
Africa, in violation of the South Africa Constitution, as well.  See Norimitsu Onishi, 
Omar al-Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015) 
(reporting that al-Bashir flew out of South Africa just hours before a South African 
court ruled that the government was legally required to arrest him); Somini 
Sengupta, Omar Bashir Case Shows International Criminal Court’s Limitations, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2015) (recounting that South Africa let Mr. Bashir fly home despite 
an order from South Africa’s High Court instructing the nation’s authorities to pre-
vent him from leaving the country); Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bashir of Su-
dan to Avoid Arrest Is Tested in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015).  African lead-
ers and the African Union (which is their trade union) protect club members even 
if it that means doing so in violation of their domestic and international obligations.  
145 See Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 22, at art. 1 (“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether commit-
ted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish.”). 
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Bassouni claims “certain crimes affect the interests of the world com-
munity as a whole because they threaten the peace and security of hu-
mankind and they shock the conscience of humanity.”146  It is true 
that genocide that is part of an intense civil war is likely to destabi-
lize neighboring countries, but such destabilization seems to be no 
more a threat to the peace and security of the international commu-
nity (or humankind) than if the civil war did not lead to genocide.  
Indeed, somewhat perversely, the destruction of the group would 
reduce one of the most significant causes of destabilization: the flow 
of refugees!  So, the “international chaos” argument is no more per-
suasive than arguments that are premised on the notion of “national 
chaos.” 
 
5.5.  International Response to Genocide:  Ways of Imagining the   
International Community 
 
As I have argued in the last sub-section, the instrumental argu-
ments that are offered to justify the assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion and intervention under R2P in relation to crimes such as geno-
cide are unpersuasive.  However, even if those instrumental 
arguments are found to be persuasive, I shall argue in this section 
that the international doctrines for the suppression (R2P) and pun-
ishment (universal jurisdiction) of certain international crimes such 
as genocide cannot be explained in instrumental terms only.  These 
two doctrines have another, less articulated purpose.  They have 
constitutive dimensions as well. They are partly processes through 
which the international community imagines its identity as a coun-
ter to the destructive communities imagined through genocidal 
acts.147  Neglect of the constitutive dimension, I shall argue, leads to 
an incomplete analysis of the function of these two doctrines.  The 
                                                      
146 M. Cherif Bassouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Om-
nes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 63, 69 (1996) (emphasis added). 
147 As I explained earlier, the idea of imagined communities is that of Benedict 
Anderson’s.  BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM, supra note 44. The role of international norms 
as means of imagining an internal community was expressed by HEDLEY BULL, THE 
ANARCHIC SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 80 (1977) (describing how, 
“[norms of cosmopolitan justice] are ideals which seek to spell out what is right or 
good for the world as a whole, for an imagined civitas maxima or cosmopolitan so-
ciety to which all individuals belong and to which their interests should be subor-
dinated.”). 
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point could even be made about legal norms, generally.  Whether 
jurisdictional or substantive, it is erroneous to see legal norms only 
in instrumental terms, as means of doing (to prevent or punish gen-
ocide). They are also ways of being, ways through which we define 
who we are or aspire to be.148 
The secondary responsibility that the international community 
has assumed to forestall genocide and punish genocidaires through 
universal jurisdiction and R2P is simultaneously instrumental 
(seeks to protect vulnerable groups) and constitutive (defines or 
imagines the identity of the international community). 
Communities, just like individuals, need the Other to constitute 
and consolidate their identities.  That is, identities are defined rela-
tionally.149  As William E. Connolly notes, “difference is a require-
ment built into the logic of identity, and the construction of other-
ness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic.”150  
Indeed, it is beyond “temptation.”  But what is this Other against 
whom the international community would be able to define itself 
here?  Against whom does the international community imagine it-
self? 
 
                                                      
148 Here, I am siding with Joseph Raz in his dispute with Ronald Dworkin in 
relation to whether law is to be understood exclusively as a means of doing (instru-
mentally) or whether it should also partly be seen as a means of being (as a means 
of constituting who we are).  Dworkin accuses Raz of misunderstanding the nature 
of law when the latter claims that “[i]n large measure what we study when we 
study the nature of law is the nature of our own self-understanding.”  Joseph Raz, 
Can There be a Theory of Law, in BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 324, 331 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmunds eds., 2005).  
Dworkin asserts, in my view somewhat too quickly, that law has no such role: “[i]f 
we want to study our own self-consciousness we would do much better to turn to 
fiction, politics, biography, depth psychology, and social science.  We reflect on the 
character of law to know what we must do, not what we are.”  RONALD DWORKIN, 
JUSTICE IN ROBS 229 (2006). It is somewhat puzzling that Dworkin who has always 
viewed law as an interpretive enterprise, deeply linked to a particular culture and 
history, would make the claim that there is a sharp distinction between who we are 
and what we are supposed to do.  What we are to do is to a great extent suggested 
by who we are.  In any case, I shall argue that jurisdiction (and by implication, law) 
is constitutive of who we are as it is a guide of what we are meant to do. 
149 See Addis, Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in 
the Age of the Diaspora, supra note 3, at 988. 
150 CONNOLLY, supra note 52, at 9.  
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5.5.1.  Homo Sapiens and Nature: A Way of Imagining the 
International Community? 
 
At the beginning of his account of the Rwanda genocide, Peter 
Gourevitch tells a story of a self-proclaimed pygmy he met when he 
visited Rwanda in 1995, soon after the genocide.  The pygmy an-
nounced that he was a pygmy, though he was five and a half feet 
tall, and perhaps would not have been assumed to be a pygmy had 
he not announced that he was.  Gourevitch claims that this self-iden-
tification is a way of “declaring himself . . . to be . . . as a fellow out-
sider,” “setting himself apart from the matter of Hutu and Tutsi.”151 
From my point of view, the pygmy’s observation about univer-
salism and the unity of humankind was equally fascinating.  He tells 
Gourevitch that it does not “matter if you are white or yellow or 
green or a black African Negro.  The concept is Homo sapiens.”152  
And then, as if that is not sufficient to lead to an international com-
munity of humankind, he adds “all humanity must unite together 
in the struggle against nature.”153  “Humanity’s struggle to conquer 
nature . . . is the only hope . . . the only way for peace and reconcili-
ation—all humanity one against nature.” For the self-proclaimed 
pygmy, the positive traits that make us all humans are not sufficient 
bases for cultivating the international community.  Nature too, 
forms the boundary against which we struggle, and must struggle 
together, for the purposes of surviving as Homo sapiens.  All these 
ethnic and racial divisions that manifest themselves in mass crimes 
such as genocide are apparently distracting us from the real enemy: 
nature.  But, of course, the self-proclaimed pygmy finally realizes 
that humanity is also part of nature and therefore nature cannot 
form the boundary. 
To be sure, this is not the first time when the boundary between 
humans and other parts of nature have been used as a way of unify-
ing humanity.  For example, there are political theorists who have 
anchored the notion of human dignity in terms of the distinction be-
tween humans and other species—human dignity as an indication 
                                                      
151 GOUREVITCH, supra note 10, at 7 (“Pygmies were Rwanda’s first inhabitants, 
a forest people, who were generally looked down upon by Hutu and Tutsi alike as 
vestigial, aboriginal lot.”).  The descendants of those pygmies are now called the 
Twa people and they constitute less than one percent of the Rwandan population. 
152 Id. at 8. In academic speak, the global community envisioned here is a com-
munity of persons, not a community of nations or groups of any sort.  
153 Id. 
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of the higher rank that humans enjoy compared to other creates of 
nature.154  Whether or not the notion of dignity can be understood 
in terms of the higher rank that humans enjoy among the rest of na-
ture—and I have argued that it cannot be155—the idea that this 
would therefore be the basis on which the international community 
imagines itself, as a community is rather thin.  The notion that the 
struggle against nature will sufficiently unite the diverse human 
race so as to minimize conflicts within and among groups seems ra-
ther unpersuasive.156 
 
5.5.2.  The International Community and the Outlaw Other—
Another Way of Imagining the International Community 
 
5.5.2.1.  The International Community and Secondary 
Responsibility 
 
As emphasized throughout this article, the state has the primary 
responsibility to respect, protect and promote human rights within 
its territory and under its jurisdiction.  It has the responsibility to 
forestall atrocity crimes such as genocide and to punish those who 
have committed such crimes.  However, the state is often in circum-
stances of genocide either unable (there is total breakdown of legal 
infrastructure) or unwilling (because the state itself is involved in 
those crimes).  The genocides in Rwanda, Nazi Germany, the Otto-
man Empire, and Darfur (Sudan) are good examples.  Under such 
circumstances, there is a need to place the responsibility on the in-
ternational community, either through individual member states or 
collectively, to ensure that the responsibility is discharged.  That is 
what universal jurisdiction and the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
are.  The former urges states to take responsibility individually, 
while the latter encourages them to act collectively.  The United Na-
tions Millennium Declaration put the collective responsibility this 
way: “We recognize that in addition to our separate responsibilities 
                                                      
154 See GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY (2011). 
155 Adeno Addis, The Role of Human Dignity in a World of Plural Values and Eth-
ical Commitments, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 403 (2013). 
156 The debate on whether and how the world should respond to climate 
change is an instructive example. 
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to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to up-
hold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the 
global level.”157 
The primary responsibility (“our separate responsibilities to our 
individual societies”) is what we might want to refer to as hard re-
sponsibility.  Hard responsibility is one that is imposed on the rele-
vant entity as a firm duty.  Here, the relevant entity is required to 
act in a particular way—to remedy a violation or to forestall one.  
Not acting in the required way is a breach of a duty and itself a legal 
wrong.  States, either through conventional or customary law, have 
assumed obligations to respect, protect and promote human rights 
within their territories and/or their jurisdictions.  Indeed, some 
commentators have even argued that the notion of sovereignty itself 
imposes a duty on state authorities to treat their citizens in a partic-
ular way.  Sovereignty is not just the right to rule but also the obli-
gation to rule in a particular way.158 
The secondary responsibility to which I have referred earlier 
might be labeled as soft responsibility.  It comes not in the form of a 
firm duty but as a legal permission suffused with moral expectation.  
Universal jurisdiction for certain international crimes, including 
genocide, is an example of a soft responsibility.  R2P straddles the 
hard/soft divide.  Some consider it a firm duty.159 
                                                      
157 U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A, Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/55/L.2, at ¶ 2 
(Sept. 8, 2002). 
158 See ICISS, supra note 109 at 8, ¶ 2.14.; see also, Thakur, supra note 113, at 818 
(“In recent times, sovereignty has been reconceived as being instrumental.  Its val-
idation rests not in a mystical reification of the state, but in its utility as a tool for 
the state serving the interests of the citizens.  International forms and precepts of 
governance must confirm to international norms and standards of state conduct.  
That is, sovereignty must be exercised with due responsibility.”); see also FRANCIS 
M. DENG ET AL, SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 
(1996); Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, supra note 101, at 19  
(“The legitimacy of coercive governments requires . . . that people play some gen-
uine, even minimal and indirect, role in their own government.  Political theorists 
disagree about what kind of participation is essential in different forms of govern-
ment, but it is generally understood (even if his is far from universally provided) 
that some form of wide-spread suffrage in the election of officials is both necessary 
and sufficient within a distinct political community.”); see also, LUKE GLANVILLE, 
SOVEREIGNTY & THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A NEW HISTORY (2014) (Making and 
defending the claim that sovereignty has always entailed responsibility as well as 
authority in this detailed historical survey of sovereignty.).   
159 See Alex J Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten, supra note 121, at 
182  (“In its first ten years, RtoP has emerged as an international norm.  With only 
a tiny handful of exceptions, states accept that they have made a commitment to 
RtoP and agree on its fundamental components.”); Luke Glanville, The International 
Community’s Responsibility to Protect, 2 GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 287, 306 
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Wherever one puts universal jurisdiction on the hard/soft re-
sponsibility divide or on the hard/soft spectrum, it is clear that R2P 
and universal jurisdiction represent two facets of the international 
community’s responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes (R2P) or to 
punish those who have engaged in such atrocities (universal juris-
diction).  Both doctrines concern crimes to which the primary re-
sponsibility holders have not responded. 
Another way to look at the relationship between primary and 
secondary responsibilities is to think of primary responsibility as im-
posing an obligation on each state to improve its political legitimacy, 
“legitimacy of its own coercive government,” but that obligation is 
to be discharged in a way that will “improve the overall interna-
tional system.”160  As I shall explain in the next section, part of that 
international order is the cultivation of and respect for an interna-
tional order of plurality and human diversity.  When that is threat-
ened, the international community, either individually or collec-
tively, will have a secondary responsibility to intervene to protect it.  
 
5.5.2.2.  Hostis Humani Generis:  The Genocidaire as The Enemy 
of All of Us 
 
As the International Court of Justice noted in its 1951 Advisory 
Opinion, genocide has a universal character both in terms of it con-
demnation and in terms “of the co-operation required ‘in order to 
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.’”161  Indeed, the Pre-
amble to the Genocide Convention emphasizes that “genocide has 
                                                      
(2010) (“[T]he ICJ has confirmed that particular actors within the international com-
munity may bear a legal responsibility to prevent the occurrence of genocide, 
though serious questions remain about the range of actors upon which this respon-
sibility may fall and the remedies available in those instances where actors fail to 
discharge their obligations.”).   
160 Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, supra note 101, at 17. 
Dworkin argues that one way a state is “defective in its legitimacy [is] when it can-
not protect those over whom it claims a monopoly of force from the invasions and 
pillage of other peoples.” Id.  See also Win-Chiat Lee, International Crimes and Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 15, 18 (Larry 
May and Zachary Hoskins eds., 2010). 
161 See Reservations to Convention on Prevention of and Punishment of Geno-
cide, supra note 31, at 23. The inside quotes are taken from the Preamble of the Con-
vention, supra note 22, at pmbl. 
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inflicted great loss to humanity,”162 not just loss to a group or a coun-
try.  The “international community as a whole” is taken to be a vic-
tim of genocide wherever that takes place.163 
In what sense is genocide in one part of the world an infliction 
of “a great loss to humanity”?  Why is genocide considered to be of 
sufficient concern to the international community that the commu-
nity either in its corporate capacity or through its individual mem-
bers will intervene to stop its commission or punish perpetrators?  
The perpetrators of the crime of genocide in the context of universal 
jurisdiction are referred to as hostis humani generis—enemies of hu-
mankind.  That is, genocide is apparently committed not just against 
the specific victims or the countries of which these victims are citi-
zens, but against all of us. 
In what sense are genocidaires enemies of humankind?164  One 
way in which genocide is an attack on humankind is that it under-
mines what Hannah Arendt calls the “salient characteristic of the 
human condition”: the potential for and the reality of diversity.  For 
Arendt, what made the Nazi crime an attack on the human condi-
tion was that it was “an attack upon human diversity as such, that 
is, upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the 
very words of ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of mean-
ing.”165  Genocide is an attack on the very nature of what makes an 
international community what it is: a community of diverse peoples 
and diverse ways of being.  The genocidaire’s attempt to create a 
pure community (and in the process cure humanity of its salient 
                                                      
162 See Convention on Genocide, supra note 22, at pmbl. 
163 William E. Conklin, The Exclusionary Boundary of the Early Modern Interna-
tional Community, 81 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 135 (2012).  See Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (March 21, 1986).  
164 The arguments in this section draw from an earlier article of mine.  See Ad-
dis, Imagining the International Commuinity, supra note 136. 
165 ARENDT, supra note 39, at 247. Michael Ignatieff makes a similar point:  
“What it means to be a human being, what defines the very identity we 
share as a species, is the fact that we are differentiated by race, religion, 
ethnicity, and individual differences. These differentiations define our 
identities both as individuals and as species . . . . A sense of otherness, of 
distinctiveness, is the very basis of the consciousness of our individuality, 
and this consciousness, based in difference, is a constitutive element of 
what it is to be a human being. To attack any of these differences . . . is to 
attack the shared element of what makes us what we are as a species.”  
Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin’s Word, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 27–28. 
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characteristic, its “infinite plurality”)166 deprives all of us of various 
possibilities of being,167 various ways of understanding the world.  
Diverse cultures, religions and ethnicities provide us with different 
and rich ways of understanding our world and ourselves as well.  
Genocide diminishes us in the literal and metaphoric sense. In the 
process of pursuing the fantasy of his pure community, the genocid-
aire disfigures the international community.  To use an Arendtian 
term, crimes such as genocide and slavery make humans “superflu-
ous” qua humans.168  While genocide is physical extermination, slav-
ery is social death.169  In both cases, a particular group and its way 
of life are removed (physically or socially) from the community of 
humankind on the grounds that they are a threat (economically, so-
cially, morally, and politically) to the pure community of the geno-
cidaire or the slaveholder.  Thus, both the genocidaire and the slave-
holder (enslaver) are properly considered as enemies of humankind. 
One aspect of the international community that is, therefore, im-
agined through the provisions of universal jurisdiction and the 
adoption of R2P is a community of diverse peoples and diverse 
ways of being.170  Indeed, the Millennium Declaration said as much 
                                                      
166 HANNAH ARENDT, VIES POLITIQUES 1 (1986); see also HANNAH ARENDT, MEN 
IN DARK TIMES 81–94 (1968). 
167 The Mexican essayist, Octavio Paz, expresses this sentiment perfectly: 
“[E]very view of the world that becomes extinct, every culture that disappears di-
minishes a possibility.”  Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, cited in JAMES 
TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AGE OF DIVERSITY 186 (1995). 
168 In a letter to Karl Jaspers, Arendt said this about radical evil: 
“What radical evil really is I don’t know, but it seems to me it somehow 
has to do with the following phenomenon: make human beings as human 
beings superfluous (not using them as mean to an end), which leaves their 
essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity; 
rather making them superfluous.” 
See Richard Bernstein, Are Arendt’s Reflection on Evil Still Relevant? 70 REV. 
POL. 64, 67–68 (2008).  
169 Orlando Patterson has powerfully made the argument of slavery as social 
death.  See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH (1982).  As Patterson 
observes, the slave is excommunicated from society.  There is “natal alienation.”  
Slavery does not simply use humans as means but it denies slaves their very hu-
manity.  Others too have seen genocide as social death.  See Claudia Card, Genocide 
and Social Death, 18 HYPATIA 63, 65 (2003) (“The holocaust was not only a program 
of mass murder but an assault on Jewish social vitality.”).  
170 Lemkin seems to have made a similar point when he observed, “[n]ations 
[for him it means ethnic groups] are essential elements of the world community.  
The world represents only so much cultural and intellectual vigor as are created by 
its component national groups . . . . Our whole heritage is a product of the contri-
bution of all peoples.” RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
   
1094 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
when it observed that shared values lead to shared future “based 
upon our common humanity in all its diversity. . .”171 
Offenses that are intended to cure us of that diversity, such as 
genocide, are the concern of all of us.  Indeed, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Cham-
ber made the point well when it observed thusly: “Those who devise 
and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold 
richness of its nationalities, races, ethnicities, and religions provide.  
This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only 
by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.”172  
Humanity is diminished by the actions of the genocidaire. 
To summarize, the international community that is imagined 
through universal jurisdiction and R2P is not a community (federa-
tion) of states or simply a community of unmoored human persons 
organized as members of global human community, but rather it is 
a community of persons as bearers of and located in particular iden-
tities (cultures, ethnicities and religions).  In this sense, the commu-
nity imagined has both a universal (international community) and 
local (ethnic, national, racial, etc.) dimension to it.  It is to make this 
point that Arendt described the Holocaust as a crime against hu-
manity perpetrated on the body of the Jews.173  Through its interven-
tion under universal jurisdiction and R2P to prevent or punish the 
genocidarie’s attempt to establish his pure community by destroy-
ing other communities, the international community both affirms 
and defines the contours of the international community.  The com-
munity it imagines is the antithesis of the genocidaire fantasy of a 
pure and superior community.  The destructive fantasy of purity is 
countered with the reality of hybridity and plurality. 
 
5.5.2.3.  Diversity and Vulnerability 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the United Nations Secretary General re-
marked at an international conference on the prevention of genocide 
that “[n]o part of the world can consider itself immune to the risk 
                                                      
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 91 (1944).  This 
means that the “destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the loss of its future 
contribution to the world.” Id. 
171 See U.N. Millennium Declaration, supra note 157, at ¶ 5; see also Id. at ¶ 6. 
172 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT 98-33-A, Judgement, ¶ 36 (April 19, 2004). 
173 ARENDT, supra note 39, at 247. 
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[of genocide].”174  Even though the statement might be considered 
too alarmist, the Secretary General has a point.  The diverse interna-
tional community, which is being shaped by globalization and 
greatly assisted by the communication revolution, is also becoming 
vulnerable due to these very factors.  Globalization is leading not 
only to greater interconnection, but to intricate partitions as well.  
Many countries are increasingly getting fractured along ethnic and 
religious lines and the communication revolution is often used to 
cultivate and deepen these fractures, making this diverse interna-
tional community vulnerable to destructive threats.  The develop-
ments of fractures and the increasingly sophisticated nature of the 
means of destruction in the hands of genocidaries and terrorists 
make the international community vulnerable.  So, the international 
community is both diverse and vulnerable to the threat of mass 
atrocities such as genocide.  A global threat requires a global re-
sponse.  Universal jurisdiction and R2P are attempts to provide such 
a response.  The international community’s interest in preventing 
and punishing genocide rests on the proposition that we live in a 
world of diversity—ethnicity, religion, race, etc.—and genocide spe-
cifically targets that diversity.  And because “almost all nations are 
patchworks of ethnic, racial and religious, and cultural groups,”175 
an offense (such as genocide) that targets people precisely because 
of those characteristics threatens the very nature of the international 
community.  The magnitude of the threat has increased as a result 
of new technologies—communication and technologies of destruc-
tion—which, as we saw in Rwanda, have made it easier to engage 
in purification quickly and efficiently. 
 
5.5.2.4.  Defining (Imagining) the International Community 
From Above and From Below 
 
The argument thus far has been that, while we rightly focus on 
the responsibility that universal jurisdiction and R2P impose on in-
dividual states and/or on the international community to prevent 
genocide or to punish those who have engaged in genocide (the in-
strumental aspect of norms), we neglect or underemphasize another 
                                                      
174 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks at International Conference on Prevention of Geno-
cide, supra note 42. 
175 David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE L. J. 85, 138 
(2004). 
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equally important role that these doctrines or norms play.  They are 
also means through which we cultivate or constitute the interna-
tional community as a community of character; they are processes 
by which we begin to define the nature or the identity of the inter-
national community of which we hear a great deal, but about which 
we are never quite clear. 
As I noted earlier, identities—individual or group, institutional 
or personal—are constituted relationally.  We define who we are in 
relation to the differences we perceive with others.  It is no different 
with communities—national or international.  Communities define 
their identities in relation to other communities.  But of course the 
international community cannot define itself vis-à-vis other commu-
nities, for in the literal sense the international community includes 
all of us in all of our plural guises.  There is no community to con-
trast itself with, for the assertion of its identity.  I suggest that it is 
through norms such as those embodied in universal jurisdiction and 
R2P—the notion that certain crimes such as genocide are an attack 
on all of us—that the international community begins to define the 
contours of its boundaries. 
The idea of enemies of humankind provides the criteria that certain 
acts are simply beyond the permissible boundary of an international 
community of humankind.176  So, universal jurisdiction and R2P are 
simultaneously instrumental and constitutive.  The international 
community on whose behalf they are invoked is at the same time 
being defended and constituted. R2P and universal jurisdiction are 
therefore performative in nature.  By “performative,” I mean to sug-
gest that they constitute what they assert already exists.177  Through 
these two doctrines “humanity,” that is “the status of being human,” 
is defended while simultaneously constituted.  In what sense is hu-
manity constituted here?  There are two ways.  First, the notion of 
                                                      
176 Carlos Nino, in another context, described the Other outside the moral 
boundary of the community of humankind as “radical evil.”  See CARLOS SANTIAGO 
NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL vii (1996). 
177 The notion of performative discourse had its popular entry in J.L. Austin’s 
work.  See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1987). Austin fa-
mously argued that language cannot only describe things but actually do things.  Id. 
at 94. Thus, for example, when the President swings a bottle of champagne at a ship 
and says “I christen this ship the ‘USS New Orleans,’” the President is not merely 
describing a christening, but performing one. See id. at 15.  Not surprisingly, Austin 
called these sorts of verbal acts “performatives.”  See also PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 223 (1991) (describing the how performative dis-
course attempts “to bring about what it asserts in the very act of asserting it.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
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“humanity” is constituted in the sense that assertions such as “gen-
ocide is a crime against the human status” aim at bootstrapping 
themselves into validity.  Second, and more importantly, by taking 
responsibility for the crimes of others by holding them accountable 
and by establishing institutions through which we judge and repress 
genocide we “‘share the onus of evil committed by others.’  We be-
come members of humanity.”178  That is, by assuming responsibility 
for genocidal acts or threats of genocide wherever they occur, we 
constitute humanity and the international community. 
Once we understand that the two doctrines have both instru-
mental and constitutive roles, we then realize that the existence of 
these norms is important.  Even when we think that these norms are 
not invoked as frequently as we would like them to be—when they 
have not closed the impunity gap—even when they are soft rather 
than hard responsibilities, and even when they do not provide the 
accountability desired by many.  Their existence and the consensus 
around them starts building a culture, an attitude as to what the na-
ture of the international community is and around what values it is 
constituted.  They are processes through which the international 
community is imagined. The international community comes to life 
more on account of the substance to which it aspires than the entity 
it represents.  The international community is a work in progress 
and the shared responsibilities in the context of genocide and other 
grave crimes contribute to that work in progress.  Shared values and 
shared future require shared responsibility. 
Shared responsibility could manifest itself in various ways.  It 
could be discharged collectively, or it could be delegated to constit-
uent parts from the bottom up (universal jurisdiction) or from the 
top down (R2P).179  This is indicative of the multiple ways in which 
the responsibility to protect, to correct and to define can be pursued.  
Universal jurisdiction is a bottom-up approach because it simply 
asks states to prosecute (or extradite) those accused of genocide if 
they are found in their territory. 
Hannah Arendt thought that truly international crimes, such as 
genocide, should be tried by duly constituted international tribu-
nals, not by a state court asserting universal jurisdiction or other 
(traditional) jurisdictional bases.  She approvingly refers to a radio 
interview in Basel by Karl Jaspers that the crime against the Jews 
                                                      
178 See Luban, supra note 18, at 320.  
179 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is another example of a top-down 
intervention in terms of punishing genocidaires.  
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was also a crime against mankind and consequently, the verdict can 
be handed down only by a court of justice representing all man-
kind.180  Arendt then goes on to assert, “insofar as the crime [against 
Jews] was a crime against humanity, it needed an international tri-
bunal to do justice to it.”181  Why was it essential for Arendt that 
crimes such as genocide be prosecuted before an international tribu-
nal (such as we have in the form of ad hoc tribunals) or the ICC?  
Her argument is that since the genocidal attack is an attack on all of 
us, only all of us, constituting ourselves in a form of international 
tribunal, can render a proper verdict.  A trial before state courts—
courts of third countries—would, in her estimation, minimize the 
monstrosity of the event and limit the universality of the injury.  Ar-
endt’s worry or complaint would apply not only when a third coun-
try invokes universal jurisdiction to punish a genocidaire, but even 
when a country invokes traditional sources of jurisdiction such as 
the nationality and passive personality principles to prosecute ac-
cused genocidaires.182 
One may also add to Arendt’s observation a practical concern 
that there is a danger that state actors may not render just punish-
ment for purely political or partisan reasons. That is, universal juris-
diction would be asserted not so much to punish a genocidaire, but 
to advance the political interest of the state asserting universal juris-
diction.183  The point of impermissible intervention becomes even 
more salient in relation to R2P when the intervention is military. It 
                                                      
180 See ARENDT, supra note 39, at 247. 
181 Id. 
182 The nationality principle would authorize a state to prosecute a national 
who had committed genocide abroad, whether or not the genocide is carried out 
against members of a group to whichever country that group belongs.  The nation-
ality principle simply allows states to regulate the conduct of their citizens any-
where in the world.  The passive personality principle, which is more controversial, 
allows states to assert jurisdiction over certain acts—such as genocide—that harm 
or intended to harm their nationals.  During the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, Israel 
controversially purported to assert passive personality jurisdiction.  Whether or not 
the assertion of passive personality jurisdiction is proper is not our concern here, 
although it is fair to point out that critics point to the fact that there was no Israel at 
the time of the crime and even if Israel had existed these were citizens of another 
country.  Arendt would have rejected it as improper on another ground, that the 
trial should be an international trial since the crime is a crime against all of us, not 
just the Jewish victims or Israel.  See ARENDT, supra note 39, at 263. 
183 Universal jurisdiction could, for example, be used to intimidate the state 
from which the accused hails, especially if the accusation is that the government of 
the state (which is still in power) was involved in the genocide. 
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is sufficient to note here, however, that it is partly this fear that com-
pelled heads of states and governments to signal that even non-co-
ercive R2P intervention ought to be coordinated through the United 
Nations.184  Coercive intervention to prevent or to stop genocide is 
to be authorized by the Security Council only.185  As I have indicated 
earlier, making the Security Council the only port of call has enor-
mous downsides.  What the Council did, or more precisely failed to 
do, during the Rwanda genocide is a very good example of why it 
ought not to be the only port of call on threatened genocide.186 
Although the establishment of international or intergovernmen-
tal tribunals would be desirable under certain circumstances, I be-
lieve it would be a mistake, as Arendt would have it, to restrict the 
punishment of genocide to jurisdiction of such tribunals.  First, the 
partiality or bias of international tribunals themselves is not always 
beyond reproach.187  Second, for various reasons there are times 
                                                      
184 As the ICISS Report indicates, military intervention is the last resort after 
“appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity . . . .  [The international community] is prepared to take collective [coercive] 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accord-
ance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in coop-
eration with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their popu-
lations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 
ICISS, supra note 109, at ¶ 139. 
185 Id. at xi. 
186 See Power, supra note 11, at 43 (reporting that the Security Council drasti-
cally scaled down the UN Peacekeeping force during the height of the genocide 
when many Tutsi were in fact getting saved from slaughter because of the deter-
rence and cover the peacekeeping force was providing. Referring to this action 
Power notes, “The UN Security Council made a decision that sealed the Tutsi’s fate 
and signaled the [Hutu] militia that it would have free rein.”). 
187 Many African leaders and political actors often complain that the Interna-
tional Criminal Court often targets Africans leaders or public officials for special 
attention and prosecution. There is some truth to that. Two sitting African presi-
dents—presidents of Kenya and Sudan—have been indicted by the ICC. And one 
former president (Charles Taylor of Liberia) is convicted by an international tribu-
nal and is in jail. Indeed, African countries have been talking about withdrawal 
from the Rome Statute since 2009. Dapo Akande, Is Kenya Pushing for a Mass African 
Withdrawal from the ICC? EUR. J. INT’L L: TALK (Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-kenya-pushing-for-a-mass-african-withdrawal-from-
the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/K9ZE-B382]. During its extraordinary October 2013 
session in Addis Ababa, the African Union adopted and issued a document entitled 
“Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Court” in which AU af-
firmed its “unflinching commitment” to fight impunity, but also expressed concern 
about what it called “the politicization and misuse of indictments against African 
leaders.” African Union Decisions and Declarations, Extraordinary Session of the 
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when international or intergovernmental tribunals are not available 
either to correct or to remedy a violation.188  There is no compelling 
reason why perpetrators of genocidal crimes should continue to 
move freely when that crime has brought untold sorrow to direct 
victims and has diminished the international community by wiping 
out or by attempting to wipe out a way of being from the face of the 
earth.  Indeed, that was the view of three judges of the International 
Court of Justice in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium (Arrest 
Warrant).189 
Third, as a normative matter, there is something to be said about 
constituting the culture of the international community from the 
bottom up or from the outside in.  A community that develops as a 
result of wider participation of the constituent parts (which univer-
sal jurisdiction promises to provide) may be more defensible and 
more legitimate.  This is so partly because the specific application of 
the principle of universal jurisdiction by various states would allow 
for experimentation and adaptation, providing a glimpse of what 
works and how it works.190  Indeed, the notion of universal jurisdic-
tion would gesture simultaneously to the federal notion of pluralism 
                                                      
African Union, Decision on African Relationship with The International Criminal 
Court (ICC), Au Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Ext_Assem-
bly_AU_Dec_Decl_12Oct2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB77-V4HZ]. 
188 Thus, for example, for the ICC to prosecute a person accused of genocide, 
either the country of which the accused is a citizen should have ratified the Rome 
Convention which established the Court and its jurisdiction or, if the country is not 
a signatory, the Security Council, under its Chapter VII authority, has to refer the 
issue to the Court to investigate and prosecute, if warranted.  Of course, the Security 
Council could do what it did in relation to Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia—
establish an ad hoc tribunal in relation of allegation of mass crimes in a particular 
country.  But it may be that none of the above options are available.  It might be 
that the country of which the accused is a citizen has not signed and ratified the 
Rome Convention and that the Security Council is deadlocked and unable to exer-
cise one of the two available options for peripheral political reasons.  Or, the re-
sources may not exist to establish the ad hoc tribunals. Under those circumstances, 
universal jurisdiction (the bottom up model) becomes the only option if the country 
that has the primary responsibility to protect and to remedy is unable and unwill-
ing to perform that function. 
189 Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 
51 (April 11) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buer-
genthal). 
190 I am here simply restating for a different purpose the classic argument in 
defense of federalism. John Stuart Mill refers to this as “experiments in living,” 
which allows the citizens to learn from the experiences of other sub-units (in this 
case nation-states) as to how the norm fares as it is applied in different circum-
stances. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND ON LIBERTY: INCLUDING ‘ESSAY ON 
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and the universal ideal of cosmopolitanism.  It in fact links the two, 
each acting on and shaping the other. 
However, it is undeniable that both in relation to universal juris-
diction and R2P (especially R2P), the risk of impermissible interven-
tion is real and we must continue to seek to develop limiting princi-
ples.191  How would one minimize impermissible interventions by 
individual states or regional groupings either to prevent or to cor-
rect crimes against all of us, such as genocide?  First, the fact that 
states or groupings would be intervening in relation to a small set of 
extreme human rights abuses such as genocide would, of course, re-
duce the frequencies of impermissible interventions.  We must resist 
the call that intervention under these two doctrines be wide open in 
relation to a large spectrum of human rights violations.  But even 
that limit clearly is not sufficient.  Second, and in addition, I think 
we should require that intervention be permitted only to the extent 
that interveners adhere to internationally accepted definition or de-
scription of those crimes (in our case, genocide).  After all, it is on 
behalf of all of us that interveners both at the front (R2P) and back 
(universal jurisdiction) ends claim to be acting.  Thus, for example, 
if a state wants to prosecute an individual for genocide under uni-
versal jurisdiction, that state needs to have adopted the international 
definition of genocide.192  The same is true for a state or group of 
                                                      
BENTHAM’ AND SELECTION FROM THE WRITINGS OF JEREMY BENTHAM AND JOHN AUSTIN 
152 (Mary Warnock ed., 2d 2003) (1859). 
191 See Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political 
Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 
41–44 (2011) (concluding, after examining all contemporary cases based on univer-
sal jurisdiction, that there were no patterns suggesting that prosecutions were being 
pursued for purposes of intimidating another state or attacking its policy. In fact, 
the cases that made it to trial were apparently very strong.).  
192 During the drafting of the Genocide Convention, there was disagreement 
as to whether “political groups” should be added to the list that includes national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious groups, as those whose intentional destruction will lead 
to the crime of genocide.  Ultimately, the drafters decided to omit political groups 
from the list.  However, there are some countries that have decided to include “po-
litical groups” in their national genocide statutes, statutes often meant to imple-
ment the international obligation under the Genocide Convention.  Colombia and 
Ethiopia are two examples of countries that have included political groups on the 
list.  See The Crime of Genocide in Domestic Laws and Penal Codes, PREVENT GENOCIDE 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic 
[https://perma.cc/949W-UHT9] (last visited April 30, 2015).  My worry about the 
inclusion of political groups is that dictatorial regimes, such as the one in power in 
Ethiopia, have used the threat of genocide to silence any political attack on political 
parties that happen to be part of the governmental coalition.  To me, the inclusion 
of political groups seems to have more downsides than upsides. There are times 
when there is an overlap between a political group and an ethnic group, but in such 
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states that wishes to intervene to protect a population that is being 
threatened with genocide.  To the extent that the right to intervene 
presupposes application of a standardized definition, it is reasona-
ble to assume that the possibility of manipulative use of the sub-
stance of a particular crime will decrease.193 
Third, the intervention would be permissible only when the pri-
mary responsibility holder is unable or unwilling to discharge its 
responsibility.  Indeed, both universal jurisdiction and R2P (espe-
cially R2P) are explicitly premised on that assumption.194  We need 
to emphasize this point. Secondary responsibility comes at the end 
of a process where various means at various stages have been uti-
lized in an attempt to make the discharge of secondary responsibil-
ity unnecessary. 
Viewed this way, secondary responsibility to protect or to cor-
rect in relation to genocide (and other mass atrocities) is not an 
event.  It is the end of a process.  The sooner we learn that lesson, the 
better off we will all be.  More importantly, the better off those on 
whose behalf we seek to intervene will be.  Some have argued that 
the prospect of intervention through R2P and universal jurisdiction 
is likely to make states reluctant to volunteer that they have a geno-
cide problem.  That is, they are likely to minimize the gravity of the 
situation for fear of collective or unilateral intervention.195  This is 
not an unreasonable fear.  Sudan clearly denied that there was any-
thing close to genocide in relation to the conflict in Darfur. Serbia 
                                                      
circumstance an attack on the political group (if part of an attack on an ethnic 
group) could be easily brought within the definition of destroying “in part, or in 
whole” the ethnic group, hence making the inclusion of “political groups” as a sep-
arate category unnecessary.  
193 See, e.g., the Ethiopian Penal Code’s definition of genocide and crimes 
against humanity. Ethiopian Penal Code art. 281. The specific article merges geno-
cide and crimes against humanity into one offense and applies the international 
definition of genocide to that combined offense. The offense of crimes against hu-
manity is essentially deemed to be a form of genocide. Not only does the penal code 
article deem crimes against humanity a genocide, but its definition of genocide is 
contradictory to the internationally accepted definition to the extent that it includes 
political groups on the list. The government has relied on this article to intimidate 
political opposition by charging and convicting opposition parties with genocide 
for criticizing the ruling party. I have dealt with this issue on a Voice of America radio 
interview on genocide. Interview with Dr. Adeno Addis (May 31, 2006), available at 
http://amharic.voanews.com/audio/2149237.html. 
194 There is a strong expectation that if a state where the offense took place or 
is taking place wishes to prevent and or prosecute, then other states must defer to 
that state.  See INAZUMI, supra note 102, at 178–95. 
195 De Guzman, supra note 140, at 35. 
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was not particularly eager to announce that there was anything re-
sembling genocide during the Balkan conflicts.  Yet, I think the 
worry is misplaced.  First, there is no reason to believe that states 
would act differently were it not for the existence of these doctrines.  
It is unlikely that Serbia and Sudan would have been more forth-
coming if R2P or universal jurisdiction had not existed.  After all, 
these were regimes which would have minimized human rights vi-
olations across the board, whether or not a violation would lead to 
outside intervention.  Second, it would likely be too late for the in-
ternational community to perform its preventive functions if it were 
to rely on information coming out of the government offices of the 
target state alone, for often when there is a genocide the government 
has been implicated either as a participant or as tacit supporter of 
the perpetrating group.  Third, there are in fact many non-govern-
ment organizations that are engaged in genocide watch.196  Those 
organizations need to be strengthened.  The United Nations system, 
as well as regional systems, need to develop early warning systems 
that do not entirely rely on governments to alert them to impending 
threats of genocide in their countries.197  Regional and United Na-
tions early warning systems would draw from and benefit a great 
deal from similar national systems, especially from those major 
countries with the resources to establish such systems.198 
                                                      
196 See, e.g., The International Alliance to End Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH, 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/whatisit.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZS7-NQUN]. 
197 Within the United Nations, a joint “Office for Genocide Prevention and 
[R2P] . . .helped establish institutional foundations for a deepening global consen-
sus by clarifying the concept . . . and engaging member states in detailed dialogue 
about its implementation.” Bellamy, supra note 121, at 177. 
198 In 2011 President Barack Obama issued Presidential Study Directive 10—
Presidential Directive on Mass Atrocities—and he subsequently took other steps, 
the purpose of which to strengthen the ability of the United States to foresee and 
prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, utilizing the full range of tools available 
to the United States—diplomatic, economic or military. Presidential Study Directive 
on Mass Atrocities, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Aug. 4, 2011) avail-
able at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-
directive-mass-atrocities [https://perma.cc/ZA9R-B92L].  In Presidential Directive 
10, the President noted, “[s]ixty six years since the Holocaust and 17 years after 
Rwanda, the United States still lacks a comprehensive policy framework and a cor-
responding interagency mechanism for preventing and responding to mass atroci-
ties and genocide.  This has left us ill prepared to engage early, proactively, and 
decisively to prevent threat from evolving into large scale civilian atrocities.” Id.  
The U.S. Atrocities Prevention Strategy has been referred to as one that “fills a huge 
gap.” Daniel Sullivan, Best and Worst of Genocide Prevention in 2012, UNITED TO END 
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The Secretary-General of the United Nations has a special ad-
viser on the prevention of genocide.  Established in 2004, the Office 
of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was created in 
the wake of the violence in Rwanda and the Balkans to serve as an 
early warning system to impending genocides so as to diminish the 
prospect of a genocidal outbreak.199  Part of the function of the office 
is to collect information from the U.N. system on serious human 
rights violations that may lead to genocide if not prevented or 
halted, to warn the Secretary-General, and through him, the United 
Nations Security Council of situations that could lead to genocide, 
and the like.200  The office has done its bit to warn about threat of 
genocide in various countries but a more robust early warning sys-
tem would have to include the active participation of various civil 
society groups as well.  As the first adviser, Juan E. Méndez noted, 
the office “cannot be regarded at present as universal and early-ac-
tion mechanism for the prevention of genocide worldwide, but ra-
ther an effort to improve the United Nations’ response to situations 
of potential massive violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law that have an ethnic, racial, religious or national character.  This 
is an effort that requires strong support from Members States, 
NGOs, academia and others.”201 
 
6.  THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND GENOCIDE WATCH:  
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
When we talk about R2P we often think of the role of the United 
Nations and national governments.  It is true that in terms of mili-
                                                      
GENOCIDE (Dec. 31, 2012), http://endgenocide.org/best-and-worst-of-genocide-
prevention-in-2012/ [https://perma.cc/V7V8-Z796]. 
199 See generally Payam Akhavan, Report on the Work of the Office of the Special 
Adviser of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, 28 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 1043. 1044–1047 (2006).  
200 The office was established pursuant to Article 99 of the U.N. Charter and 
Security Council Resolution 1366 of 2001 which expressed the Council’s commit-
ment to “save people from raves of armed conflicts” and towards that end ex-
pressed “its willingness to give prompt consideration to early warning or preven-
tion cases brought to its attention by the Secretary-General.” (para. 5).  See also Juan 
Méndez, Possibilities for Genocide Prevention, in EXPLAINING DARFUR: LECTURES ON 
THE ONGOING GENOCIDE 49–60 (Fouad Ibrahim, intro. 2006). 
201 Méndez, supra note 200, at 50–51. 
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tary intervention to prevent or stop genocide, it is the United Na-
tions and governments which would be playing central roles.  While 
protection is first and foremost the responsibility of states and sec-
ondarily the responsibility of the United Nations, we often forget 
that there is a crucial role for another component of the international 
community—civil society.202  By civil society, I mean to refer to both 
international and national human rights NGOs which can contrib-
ute to the prevention of genocide by, among other things, providing 
information that alerts relevant international actors about the condi-
tion in a particular country or society to ensure that those societies 
are watched carefully.203  As I noted earlier, many countries are or 
ought to be on genocide watch, for they exhibit many of the condi-
tions that prevail prior to genocidal events.  I mentioned earlier that 
there are in fact non-governmental agencies that are engaged in 
monitoring countries and regions for any signs of the threat of gen-
ocide.204  Strengthening the capacities of those organizations, espe-
cially local organizations, to perform the important function of col-
lecting information for purposes of early warning should be part of 
the international community’s secondary responsibility to protect.205  
                                                      
202 See Roberto Belloni, Civil Society and the Responsibility to Protect, 28 GLOBAL 
SOCIETY 158, 159 (2014) (“A strong and active civil society can provide both a posi-
tive contribution to the adoption and implementation of R2P norms and be a bul-
wark against the spread of violence.”). 
203 I must note here that Intergovernmental Human Rights Organizations 
(IHRO) such as the UN Human Rights Committee and the Human Rights Council 
also play a very significant role in terms of reports they may have on the conditions 
of human rights in a particular country which may signal to the international com-
munity that conditions for mass atrocities prevail and conditions need to be moni-
tored.  
204 See GENOCIDE WATCH, http://genocidewatch.net/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZPU-5MMH] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). There are good rea-
sons for establishing a genocide watch and alert system within the UN General Sec-
retariat. Some of the established international human rights NGOs have been active 
and effective in terms of collecting information about impending threats of geno-
cide.  See Power, supra note 11, at 39 (stating “Human Rights Watch supplied exem-
plary intelligence [on the Rwanda Genocide].”). 
205 See MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVITIES BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 22 (1998) (stating that the power 
of human rights NGOs comes not only because they are able to collect data and 
write reports on human rights conditions of countries, but also from the fact that 
they utilize the media to transmit and publicize those data and conditions making 
early intervention possible). See also Howard Ramos, James Ron, and Oskar N. T. 
Thomas, Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000, 44 J. OF 
PEACE RES. 385 (2007) (stating that international human rights NGOs do often influ-
ence the media from the developed world to cover issues that would otherwise not 
be covered, especially conditions in developing countries). 
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But what are some of the conditions that would prevail prior to gen-
ocide, signaling an impending genocide?  The immediate triggering 
or precipitating event that activates the relevant destructive bound-
ary is often unpredictable.  It might be a murder of a member of one 
group by a member or members of the hated group.  It might be a 
rumor that the hated group is planning to attack.206  Or, as was the 
case in Rwanda, the leader of the ethnically fractured country is as-
sassinated and rumor spreads that it was members of the hated eth-
nic group, the Tutsi, that slain the leader who is a member of the 
group (Hutu) that starts the genocidal attack.207 
Even though the immediate precipitating events might be hard 
to predict, it will be possible to assess what conditions have to exist 
for such events to be transformed as triggers of genocidal sprees.  I 
shall mention some of the factors in the next paragraph, but let me 
add here one more thing about precipitating events.  Donald Horo-
witz has argued persuasively that in terms of collective violence (in 
Horowitz’s case it was what he called “the deadly ethnic riot”), the 
more ambiguous the precipitant factor the longer the lull period sep-
arating the precipitant event and the collective violence, whether a 
riot or a genocide.  The reason for this is because the ambiguous 
event needs to be interpreted and that might require time.208  The 
precipitant event is by definition significant to the participants.  It 
matters not that outsiders think of it as trivial.209 
So, what conditions are likely to prevail before an impending 
genocide?  First, Charles Tilly has shown in his comparative work 
on collective violence, such as ethnic riots, that the likely occurrence 
of genocide is not simply a matter of pre-existing hatred between 
the relevant groups, but it is also a question of the nature of the po-
                                                      
206 For the nature and function of rumors in collective violence, see HOROWITZ, 
supra note 72, at 74–88. 
207 The plane carrying the president, a Hutu, was shot down and rumors 
blamed Tutsi rebels. A Hutu militia attached to the government began the slaughter 
of Tutsi citizens. It might be worth mentioning here that quite often, perhaps even 
always, it is political activist and political entrepreneurs who accentuate the us-
them boundary capable of leading to organize destructive violence. One sees that 
in cases such as the Rwanda genocide and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herze-
govina.  
208 See HOROWITZ, supra note 72, at 93 (“The more ambiguous the precipitant, 
the more it requires interpretation, and therefore the longer the interval may be.”). 
209 Id. at 270–71. 
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litical regime in control.  Genocide is most likely to occur in coun-
tries whose regimes are low-capacity and undemocratic.210  Aristotle 
long ago pointed out that anger emanates from fear.211  To this Don-
ald Horowitz adds that the triggering or precipitating event in gen-
ocidal attacks imparts proximity to that fear.212  In a country with a 
low-capacity undemocratic regime, the fear that the hated group 
will likely behave in the way the precipitating event indicates and 
with impunity is likely to be high, especially when the government 
is from the hated group.  Conversely, Charles Tilly shows that gen-
ocide or group violence generally is least likely to occur under re-
gimes that are high-capacity democratic, for grievances have outlets 
in the political process and the tendency of some activists to go the 
violent route would be effectively checked.  There are two other 
types of regimes in this typology between the two extremes that I 
mentioned: low-capacity democratic and high-capacity undemo-
cratic.  There is more likelihood for group violence to occur under 
these regimes than under high-capacity democratic regimes, but the 
violence is likely to be very different from those in low-capacity un-
democratic regimes.  For example, in a high-capacity undemocratic 
regime, as was the case with Turkey’s strong hold of the military not 
too long ago, collective ethnic violence is more likely to manifest it-
self in terrorism or insurgency (as is the case with Kurds) than gen-
ocide.213  To put it simply, the international community (both inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations) should keep 
special watch on regimes where race, ethnicity or religion are salient 
                                                      
210 CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE (2003). Of course, it is 
even more likely to occur in a failed state.  See Krain, supra note 15, at 581 (“Geno-
cides and politicides are almost always a consequence of other types of State Failure 
such as civil war.”). 
211 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC Book II, Chap. 5 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Dover 2004); 
see also E.N. ANDERSON AND BARBARA A. ANDERSON, WARNING SIGNS OF GENOCIDE: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 35–57 (2013).  
212 HOROWITZ, supra note 72, at 548. 
213 TILLY, supra note 210. In high-capacity and undemocratic regimes, “a much 
higher proportion of all collective violence pits governmental agents against citi-
zens rather than setting groups of citizens at each other throats.” Id. at 232.  China 
may offer another example.  Although China has discontented ethnic minorities 
such as the Uighurs and the Tibetans, it is unlikely that there would be sustained 
group violence among ethnic group within the country. What is likely is insurgency 
against the government.  There is, for example, the East Turkestan Islamic Move-
ment claiming to represent the interest of Uighurs, which the government of China 
has labeled a terrorist group.  
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features of political and social life214 and where the regime is both 
dictatorial and low-capacity so as to pressure them both to democ-
ratize and to build their capacity to respond to challenges to the de-
mocratization process.215 
Second, as I noted earlier, a regime which is low-capacity un-
democratic and one that has formally organized the political commu-
nity along ethnic, racial or national lines should be watched care-
fully, for the probability of identity-based violence that will develop 
into a full genocide is considerably high.  In circumstances of this 
sort, what normally happens is that those identities are defined or 
viewed as if they were primordial making it a challenge to develop 
interethnic civic ties which are necessary conditions to reduce col-
lective identity-based violence.  Evidence shows that group violence 
is absent or less likely in political communities where there are inter-
ethnic civic ties—integrated sports associations or clubs, business or 
professional associations, political parties—which are likely to “kill 
rumors, remove misunderstandings, and often police neighbor-
hoods.”216  The development and cultivation of such institutions will 
be a crucial step in the prevention of interethnic violence which 
might lead to full-scale genocide.  The problem with dictatorial re-
gimes (whether of the low-capacity or high-capacity kind) is that 
they often deny such groups political or civic space to cultivate the 
very ties that are meant to reduce tensions and suspicions among 
groups, mainly because those regimes survive by playing one group 
against the other.  The international community (both in its inter-
governmental and nongovernmental dimensions) needs to identify 
such regimes and put sufficient and sustained pressure on them to 
provide the necessary political and legal space for such interethnic 
                                                      
214 “Ethno-politics and state failure are closely linked . . . . Failed States threaten 
to become genocidal states.” Christian P. Scherrer, Preventing Genocide: The Role of 
the International Community, PREVENT GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 8, 2000), 
http://preventgenocide.org/prevent/scherrer.htm [https://perma.cc/V2DK-
99ZE]. 
215 Of course, there are times when leaders of high-capacity undemocratic re-
gimes, such as Nazi Germany, itself engage in genocide, but under current circum-
stances that scenario seems unlikely.   
216 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CIVIC LIFE: HINDUS AND 
MUSLIMS IN INDIA 47 (2002). But one of course could ask whether the peace is the 
result of the interethnic ties or that the interethnic ties are the result of peace. The 
chicken and egg question might be raised in relation to the evidence here. 
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institutions to flourish.217  And in the event that such pressure does 
not lead to change and that there was an imminent threat to geno-
cidal attacks, the international community should be prepared to in-
tervene to exercise its secondary responsibility.218  Evidence seems 
to be clear that “[one] approach that does seem to succeed at stop-
ping the killing once it has begun is overt military intervention in 
favor of targets or against the perpetrator.”219 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Genocide is unique among international crimes in the sense that 
both the intent that animates it and the manner in which the plan is 
pursued are group-based or group-oriented.220  The intent that pro-
pels it is one of destroying a group “as such.”  That plan is often 
carried out by a group (often assisted by a government) which, in 
the process of eliminating members of the victim group, attempts to 
simultaneously ensure the solidity and purity of itself as a group.  
Genocide is indeed an exercise in community building. 
The international response to genocide through the two doc-
trines I have explored is obviously group based as well.  The inter-
national community is responding as a community of humankind 
to protect or to sanction those who seek “to inflict[] great losses to 
                                                      
217 See Campbell, supra note 34, at 164–65 (showing that even in circumstances 
where there is “a high degree of ethnic conflict. . .genocide is normally absent where 
ethnic groups are functionally interdependent.”).   
218 Having a good early warning system or the capacity to predict as to 
whether a particular circumstance is pregnant with genocide, while good, is clearly 
not sufficient to prevent genocide. There has to be the commitment to act to prevent. 
Three months before the Rwanda genocide, beginning in January 1994, the Cana-
dian general in charge of the United Nations contingent in Rwanda warned UN 
headquarters in New York that the situation in the country was of serious concern 
and that unless he received reinforcement there is going to be a blood bath. He 
pleaded not once, but several times. He sent five cables begging for help. The inter-
national community, including the Permanent Five, looked the other way.  See 
Power, supra note 11, at 5. 
219 Krain, supra note 15. 
220 Some claim that all international crimes are group oriented.  See Neha Jain, 
Individual Responsibility For Mass Atrocities: In Search of A Concept of Perpetration, 61 
AM. J. COMP. L. REV. 831, 835 (2013) (“The main telling feature of an international 
crime as contrasted with its domestic counterpart is that it is inherently collective 
in nature, for the perpetrators as well as the victims.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
   
1110 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
humanity.”221  The loss is not just to a group or a nation; it is to “hu-
manity” itself.  In its 1951 advisory opinion, the International Court 
of Justice noted that the Genocide Convention “was manifestly 
adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose . . .  [I]ts 
object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain 
human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most 
elementary principles of morality.”222  When the international com-
munity responds to the threat of the “very existence of certain hu-
man groups” and when it punishes those who have perpetrated the 
crime of genocide, it endorses “the most elementary principles” that 
are the foundation of an international community: a community of 
diverse peoples who are united in their very humanity and vulner-
ability.  As the Millennium Declaration put it: shared values lead to 
shared future “based upon our common humanity in all its diver-
sity. . .”223 
If genocide is indeed an attack on all of us, then not to respond 
to genocidal attacks or threatened genocide is to bring into question 
the validity or sincerity of the international legal claim that the gen-
ocidaire is an “enemy of all humankind.”  Even more worryingly, 
the lack of response sends a signal to others that genocidal attacks 
can go on with impunity.  This last point was not lost on Hitler. Just 
before he invaded Poland in August 1939, he declared: “Our 
strength is in our quickness and our brutality . . . . What the weak 
European civilisation thinks about me does not matter . . . . I have 
given the order and will have everyone shot who utters one word of 
criticism . . . . Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my 
Death’s Head units, with the order to kill without pity or mercy all 
men, women, and children of the Polish race or language. Who still 
talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?”224  Perhaps a 
forceful response by the international community during the 
Rwanda genocide225 might have made genocidaires in the Balkans 
                                                      
221 See, Convention on Genocide, supra note 22, at pmbl. 
222 Reservations to Convention on Genocide, supra note 31, at 23.  
223 See U.N. Millennium Declaration, supra note 157, at ¶ 5.  See also id, at ¶.6. 
224 The quote was reported by The Times of London, Nov. 24, 1945 (emphasis 
added).  See also New York Times, November 24, 1945; Hannibal Travis, Did the 
Armenian Genocide Inspire Hitler? Turkey, Past and Future, 20 MIDDLE EAST Q. 27 
(2013). 
225 See Ban Ki-moon, supra note 42 (“Ladies and Gentlemen, In the face of the 
violence in Rwanda, the Security Council withdrew the UN peacekeeping opera-
tion, thereby taking away the sorely needed international ‘eyes and ears’ on the 
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or in Darfur think twice before they engaged in genocidal acts.  We 
will never know if forceful responses during the prior genocidal 
events would have prevented subsequent genocidal outbreaks, but 
we know for certain that a culture of impunity does not diminish the 
prospect or frequencies of genocidal attacks. 
But this article has also argued that the international doctrines 
through which the international community responds (or is meant 
to respond) to the threat or the act of genocide—universal jurisdic-
tion and R2P—are not simply functional or instrumental.  They are 
constitutive (performative) as well.  They are processes through 
which the international community is imagined.  The interests that 
are protected by these doctrines are not merely the interest of this or 
that group or this or that nation (of which members of the group are 
citizens), but rather they are interests of the international commu-
nity as a whole.  The injury that genocide inflicts is an injury to all 
of us.226 
How are universal jurisdiction and R2P performative?  First, the 
assertion expressed by the two doctrines that “genocide is a crime 
                                                      
ground. The UN was also deeply tarnished by its actions and inactions at Srebren-
ica.”).  The United States, too, looked the other way, refusing to label the massacre 
as genocide, for fear that so labelling it would require it to intervene. Susan Rice, 
the  National Security Advisor in the Obama Administration and at the time of the 
Rwanda genocide the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [in the Clinton 
Administration], expressed that thinking astonishingly candidly. She said “If we 
use the word ‘genocide’ and are seen as doing nothing [in Rwanda], what will be 
the effect on the November [congressional] election?” Power, supra note 11 at 33.  
President Bill Clinton later (speaking to the crowd assembled at the Rwandan in-
ternational airport) expressed regret for not having intervened earlier. “We have 
come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and 
the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done 
to try to limit what occurred.” Id. at 3. The failure is said to have had an enduring 
impact on Clinton. He is said to have remarked that if the U.S. had intervened ear-
lier it would “have saved at least a third of the lives that were lost.” Bill Clinton: We 
Could Have Saved 300,000 Lives in Rwanda, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2013 at 1:15 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100546207.  Saving a third would have meant saving at 
least 300,000 people!  
226 This is, of course, in contrast to our attitude to the violations of human 
rights that are not part of the universal jurisdiction or R2P list. Even though the 
international community seeks to hold primary responsibility holders accountable 
for the protection of all of the rights of individuals within their territories and under 
their jurisdictions, the human rights violations outside the universal jurisdiction 
and R2P list are not considered injuries to all of us. In an earlier article, I have re-
ferred to the international community’s attitude toward those rights as individual-
ist cosmopolitanism, and to its attitude towards rights and interests protected un-
der universal jurisdiction and R2P as communitarian cosmopolitanism.  See Addis, 
Imagining the International Community, supra note 136, at 159–60.  
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against the human status, a crime against all of us,” constitutes “hu-
manity,” as David Luban notes227, by aiming to bootstrap the idea of 
humanity into validity.  Second, and more importantly, by invoking 
those doctrines to take responsibility for the crimes of others by 
holding them accountable for the crime of genocide, we “share the 
onus of evil committed by others.  We become members of human-
ity.”228 That is, by assuming responsibility for genocidal acts or 
threats of genocide wherever they occur we constitute humanity 
and the international community.  Luban is entirely correct when he 
noted, citing Arendt, that “belonging to humanity, or even creating 
humanity, is something that we do,”229 for humanity “exists only 
when we shoulder the demanding forms of cross-border responsi-
bility.”230 
 
                                                      
227 See Luban, supra note 175, at 87. 
228 See Luban, supra note 18 at 320.  
229 See id. at 319.  
230 Id. “We take responsibility for the crimes of others by holding them ac-
countable, and so the practical way we constitute humanity will conspicuously in-
clude the construction of new institutions to hold wrongdoers accountable.” Id. at 
320.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/1
